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THE DEVELOPING LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY AT THE WHITE COLLAR AND
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL
ANDREA R. WAINTROOB*
INTRODUCTION
The likely trend in enforcement of equal employment opportunity
law in the next decade will be toward increased focus by governmen-
tal enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs on perceived prob-
lems in the employment of minorities and women in white collar
and professional positions. The Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs' Affirmative Action Guidelines indicate this trend by
requiring government contractors to direct "special attention" to
the underutilization of women and minorities at the white collar and
professional level in their affirmative action goal setting.
* B.A., Brown University; J.D., University of Chicago. Associate, Vedder, Price, Kaufman
& Kammholz, Chicago, Illinois.
1. The OFCCP Guidelines declare:
Based upon the Government's experience with compliance reviews under the
Executive Order programs and the contractor reporting system, minority groups
are most likely to be underutilized in departments and jobs within departments
that fall within the following Employer's Information Report (EEO-1) designa-
tions: officials and managers, professionals, technicians, sales workers, office
and clerical and craftsmen (skilled). As categorized by the EEO-1 designations,
women are likely to be underutilized m departments and jobs within depart-
ments as follows: officials and managers, professionals, technicians, sales work-
ers (except over-the-counter sales in certain retail establishments), craftsmen
(skilled and semi-skilled). Therefore, the contractor shall direct special atten-
tion to such jobs in his analysis and goal setting for minorities and women.
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1978).
White collar positions include jobs falling within the following categories as defined by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs in the EEO-1 forms and regulations. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601-1601.59 (1978) as amended;
Department of Labor Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP") Rules
and Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1978) as amended.
Officials and Managers.-Occupations requiring administrative personnel who
set broad policies, exercise overall responsibility for execution of these policies,
and direct individual departments or special phases of a firm's operations. In-
cludes: officials, executives, middle management, plant managers, department
managers, and superintendents, salaried supervisors who are members of man-
agement, purchasing agents and buyers, and kindred workers.
Professional. -Occupations requiring either college graduation or experience of
such kind and amount as to provide a comparable background. Includes: ac-
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An increased emphasis on white collar and professional level em-
ployment practices will pose difficult problems of concept and com-
pliance for employers and the courts. To a large degree, the law of
equal employment opportunity has developed in a blue collar con-
text. Case law fashioned to deal with the problems of providing
equal employment opportunity for employees who work with their
hands rather than with people, paper, or ideas cannot be applied
without alteration or adjustment to employment practices at the
white collar and professional levels. The problems of selecting and
evaluating workers whose success depends upon such intangibles as
salesmanship or innovation necessarily are very different from the
problems of selecting assembly line workers or craftsmen. They re-
quire different procedures and are deserving of a different standard
of judicial evaluation.
A review of the case law indicates that, although the courts have
not articulated distinct rules or standards for upper level employ-
ment, they have not been insensitive to the special problems faced
by employers in this area. The courts apparently have taken a slid-
ing scale approach to employment practices; as a court's estimation
countants and auditors, airplane pilots, and navigators, architects, artists, che-
mists, designers, dietitians, editors, engineers, lawyers, librarians, mathemati-
cians, natural scientists, registered professional nurses, personnel and labor re-
lations workers, physical scientists, physicians, social scientists, teachers, and
kindred workers.
Technicians.-Occupations requiring a combination of basic scientific knowl-
edge and manual skill which can be obtained through about 2 years of post high
school education, such as is offered in many technical institutes and junior
colleges, or through equivalent on-the-job training. Includes: computer pro-
grammers and operators, drafters, engineering aides, junior engineers, mathe-
matical aides, licensed, practical or vocational nurses, photographers, radio
operators, scientific assistants, surveyors, technical illustrators, technicians
(medical, dental, electronic, physical science), and kindred workers.
Sales.-Occupations engaging wholly or primarily in direct selling. Includes:
advertising agents and salesworkers, insurance agents and brokers, stock and
bond salesworkers, demonstrators, salesworkers and sales clerks and cashier-
checkers, and kindred workers.
Office and Clerical.-Includes all clerical-type work regardless of level of diffi-
culty, where the activities are predominantly nonmanual though some manual
work not directly involved with altering or transporting the products is included.
Includes: bookkeepers, cashiers, collectors (bills and accounts), messengers and
office helpers, office machine operators, shipping and receiving clerks, stenogra-
phers, typists and secretaries, telegraph and telephone operators, and kindred
workers.
1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 1881, at 1459.
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of a particular job's mental difficulty, communication and educa-
tional requirements, prestige, and social importance increases, the
more apt it becomes to require complex, particularized, and con-
vincing evidence before finding that a prima facie or conclusive case
of discrimination has been established.
This Article surveys and evaluates the case law that has devel-
oped in the white collar and professional areas to determine both the
substantive standards and standards of proof that courts have ap-
plied to determine the legality of challenged practices. It suggests
that the courts have tended to judge employment practices at white
collar and professional levels by a standard of procedural fairness.
The Article will analyze the law on white collar employment prac-
tices to determine whether white collar employers may base employ-
ment decisions on subjective evaluations of candidates and what
employment tests properly may be used in this area. The Article
then will consider what a plaintiff must show to establish a prima
facie case of white collar discrimination. The following specific
questions will be examined:
1. What are relevant statistical comparisons?
2. Are statistical showings sufficient without more to estab-
lish a prima facie case9
3. Are employment practices judged on a component-by-
component basis or by their overall ("bottom line") effect?
4. What non-statistical factors are relevant to a prima facie
showing of discrimination?
Finally, the Article addresses the manner in which employers may
prevent a court from drawing an inference of discrimination from a
statistical showing and the application of the business necessity
defense in the white collar context.
WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 has been interpreted to
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1974). Although this Article deals primarily with cases decided
under Title VII, the relevance of these cases to actions brought by the OFCCP under Execu-
tive Order 11246 probably can be assumed. Title VII cases are relevant by analogy to enforce-
ment actions under the Executive Order and some courts have held that Title VII is a
substantive limitation on the Executive Order. United States v. East Tex. Motor Freight
1979]
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prohibit three types of race or sex discrimination: 1) disparate treat-
ment; 2) policies or practices that perpetuate in the present the
effects of past discrimination;3 and 3) policies or practices that have
a disparate impact on women or minorities and that are not justified
by business necessity I Only the first type of discrimination involves
an intent to discriminate.
The prohibitions against discrimination contained in Executive
Order 112461 and Title VII apply to all employment practices-
hiring, promotion, transfer, and discharge. Rather than analyzing
the law as to each practice, this Article focuses on the criteria
that employers use to make these decisions. This is because the
methods that employers use to make their employment decisions
tend not to differ according to the type of decision and because the
courts appear to have applied the same standards to each type of
decision. Basically, employees are judged by two general types of
criteria: subjective and objective criteria. Subjective criteria are
those that involve an element of judgment or discretion on the part
of the evaluator. Objective criteria are standards or requirements
that are applied automatically to all employees.
Subjectwe Criteria in the White Collar Context
Rowe v. General Motors Corp.6 is the leading decision on subjec-
tive employment practices. Rowe took place in a blue collar context
and involved a black production worker who alleged that he had
been discriminatorily denied promotion to the salaried positions of
foreman or clerk. At the time of suit, two methods of promotion
existed at the General Motors plant where the plaintiff was em-
Sys., Inc., 564 F.2d 179, 185 (5th Cir. 1977). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705,
1719-20 n.35 (1979). Moreover, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
suggest that the legislature has adopted a policy of interpreting consistently the federal
statutes that regulate labor practices. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978).
3. The continued vitality of this doctrine has been placed in doubt by the Supreme Court's
decision in United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Several courts have held that
individual plaintiffs cannot bring "continued effects" actions when they did not lodge a
complaint at the time of the original act of discrimination. Farris v. Board of Educ. of St.
Louis, 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978); Freude v. Bell Tel. Co., 438 F Supp. 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Dickerson v. United States Steel, 439 F Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See text accompanying
notes 302-15 infra.
4. B. SCHLEI & P GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMiNATION LAW 1 (Student ed. 1976).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ployed. A worker's supervisor could nominate him for promotion or
the worker could nominate himself. Under the self-nomination pro-
cedure, the promotion committee would not act until it had received
the recommendation of the worker's immediate supervisor. Thus,
under either method, a worker's chance for promotion depended in
part on his foreman's subjective evaluation of his ability, merit, and
capacity 7 Until shortly before trial, General Motors did not post
notices of vacancies in salaried positions. The plaintiff's statistics
showed that the end result of this promotional system was a marked
underrepresentation of blacks in salaried jobs.8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that General Motors' promotional practices violated Title
VII in five respects:
(i) The foreman's recommendation is the indispensable single
most important factor in the promotion process.
(ii) Foremen are given no written instructions pertaining to
the qualifications necessary to promotion
(iii) Those standards which were determined to be controlling
are vague and subjective.
(iv) Hourly employees are not notified of promotion oppor-
tunities nor are they notified of the qualifications necessary to
get jobs.
(v) There are no safeguards in the procedure designed to avert
discriminatory practices.9
The Rowe condemnation of subjective, unsafeguarded employment
practices has been widely followed in all types of employment cases.
Although a court is apt to condemn an employment system at any
job level that is deficient in all five Rowe respects, it will condemn
subjective white collar employment standards less readily than blue
collar standards. In the white collar context, courts are less likely
to insist on the elimination of subjectivity than they are to require
that the evaluation procedure be fair and safeguarded. One com-
mentator has suggested some reasons for the different judicial ap-
proach to white collar jobs:
7. Id. at 353.
8. On the date of trial, out of 702 salaried workers, 27 were black. Of 370 promotions in
the two year period between February, 1967 and February, 1969, 26 went to blacks. Prior to
1962, the defendant hired no blacks for its production lines. Id. at 357 n.17.
9. Id. at 358-59.
1979]
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Judges are far more likely to have personal knowledge of the jobs
of plaintiffs in the white collar context, such as airline steward-
esses and salesmen, than of the jobs of blue collar plaintiffs. They
better appreciate the type of work upper-level plaintiffs perform
and recognize the different variables an employer might reasona-
bly consider when searching for personnel to fill these positions.
Judges may also feel that employees who have greater contact
with outsiders in the course of their work should be subject to
some sort of subjective evaluation.'0
Whatever the reasons, as the employment level rises, judicial toler-
ance of subjectivity increases. For example, when evaluating univer-
sity decisions to award tenure to professors, the courts may recog-
nize explicitly the central importance of subjective practices." Con-
versely, at the low end of the white collar scale, non-specialized
clerical jobs, the judicial approach is nearly the same as in the blue
collar context.
Outside the special historical context of integration in the
South, 2 the courts have tended to be sympathetic to the need for
10. Note, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs,
54 U. DFr. J. Uaa. L. 165, 186 (1976).
ii. See, e.g., Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
12. Although notable exceptions to judicial tolerance of subjective decision making at
higher level white collar jobs exist, these exceptions probably are attributable to their unique
historical context: elimination of de jure segregation in the South. United States v. Coffeeville
Consol. School Dist., 365 F Supp. 990 (N.D. Miss. 1973), and United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 459 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1972), concern the consequences of the consolidation of pre-
viously segregated school districts. In both cases, the schools involved had to cut back on staff
after consolidation. In Texas Educ. Agency, 67 members of the faculty were dismissed. Of
the 67, 58 were black teachers and 4 were black administrators. Although the decisions were
purportedly made as a result of teacher evaluation, the board did not always abide by the
results of its own rating system. In Coffeeville, the Board fired 7 black teachers, apparently
in an effort to maintain a 50/50 ratio of black to white teachers. Again, the firings were
purportedly based on subjective teacher evaluations. Both courts reacted by ordering the
schools to apply strictly objective criteria. In Texas Educ. Agency, the Fifth Circuit appended
to its opinion a model of an acceptable teacher evaluation form. This form was designed to
reflect only length of tenure and educational attainments; no place was provided in the form
for any evaluation of teaching ability.
The case of Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss. 1974),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976), was brought in the
aftermath of integration of the previously segregated service. The MCES is a state service
designed to educate and assist farm families. Prior to 1965, MCES maintained two segregated
branches, each of which served a clientele of its own race. When the two branches were
integrated in 1965, whites were given the top male and female posts in each county. Blacks
who had supervisory responsibility over other black professionals prior to 1965 lost all supervi-
sory responsibility. From 1965 to 1970, 87 whites were promoted to the top professional
[Vol. 21:45
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subjective decision-making for higher levels of white collar employ-
ment. When management or professional level plaintiffs have pre-
vailed, they generally have been able to show that the decision-
making procedure was unfair.
Female plaintiffs have prevailed when they have demonstrated
that the employment process was tainted by a prior determination
that women lack supervisory ability or are less acceptable as profes-
sional employees than are men. In Kohn v. Royall, Koegal & Wells, 1.
positions in the various counties; no blacks were promoted to top positions in these years.
MCES claimed to base its promotion on "objective" criteria, but the court perceived that
these criteria-degree held, length of service, technical knowledge, job performance and
concept of job applied for-were not all objective. Id. at 133, 142.
Salaries for MCES professional workers were based on the independent evaluations of two
supervisors. They used a form which the court described as "a comprehensive one which
attempts to measure knowledge and proficiency as well as personal traits such as attitude,
personality, temperament and habits." Id. at 135. Over the five year period from 1967 to 1971,
blacks on an average had received a score 5.72 points below the average white score. The court
noted that "[t]he possibility of this difference occurring in a racially unbiased promotion
system, is less than 1/10 of 1%." Id. As a result of the consistently lower ratings given to black
workers, the average black salary was lower than the average salary paid to white workers.
The court found that MCES had discriminated against blacks at the time of merger by failing
"to adopt and apply reasonable, objective and racially nondiscriminatory criteria in reassign-
ing employees in the merged organization." Id. at 140. The court also found that the evalua-
tion forms were discriminatory:
a substantial portion of the evaluation rating relates to such general characteris-
tics as leadership, public acceptance, attitude toward people, appearance and
grooming, personal conduct, outlook on life, ethical habits, resourcefulness, ca-
pacity for growth, mental alertness, and loyalty to organization [Tihese
are traits which are susceptible to partiality and to the personal taste, whim, or
fancy of the evaluator.
Id. at 142.
The court did not hold that the use of subjective criteria was per se invalid, but rather, held
that the defendant had not validated its evaluation forms and, thus, had failed to rebut the
inference of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, citing Rowe and Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972), the court implied that subjective standards
could not be used: "the discriminatory effect of MCES's promotion policies having been
firmly established, the burden was on the defendants to overcome the presumption by satis-
factory proof that their actions were based on nonracial objective promotion standards." 372
F Supp. at 143. The district court ordered MCES to give first priority to blacks for future
promotions and prescribed a plan to implement this relief which set forth objective criteria
for promotion of professional employees. The objective criteria included academic degree,
technological ability, technical knowledge as displayed in in-service training, and length of
service. On appeal the circuit court enjoined use of the performance evaluation form until a
new form could be developed and validated in accordance with EEOC guidelines and ap-
proved by the court. 528 F.2d at 515. The opinions of both the district court and the Fifth
Circuit are unclear regarding whether the new performance evaluations could include ele-
ments of subjectivity.
13. 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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a district court certified a female's class action against a Wall Street
law firm. The court commented that:
[t]here is no doubt that hiring a professional requires weighing
many subjective factors contributing to the applicant's qualifica-
tions as a whole, above and beyond the more objective academic
qualifications. We cannot agree, however, that this fact immu-
nizes discriminatory practices in professional fields from attack
on a class basis Although a law firm is undoubtedly free
to make complex, subjective judgments as to how impressive an
applicant is, it is not free to inject into the selection process, the
a priori assumption that, as a whole, women are less acceptable
professionally than men.'4
Thus, the flaw in Royall's hiring practices was not their nearly com-
plete subjectivity, but rather, that women were evaluated in a
biased manner.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has applied a
similar standard to the promotion practices of a bank. In EEOC
Decision 72-0721, 5 female bank employees charged that they were
discriminatorily denied promotions to the position of trust officer.
The EEOC found that the defendant bank employed no female trust
officers in three of its branches.' It compared a sample of five fe-
male trust officers with four male trust officers. The EEOC found
that the five women had an average length of service of 20.5 years
with the bank; the men's average length of service was only 4.25
years. Moreover, the women were paid an average salary that was
$1,100.00 lower then the men's. 7 Of the 68 people in the training
program from January, 1969 to April, 1970, only 1 was female.' 8
These figures led the EEOC to conclude that the bank had discrimi-
nated against women. It stated that under these circumstances, the
bank's use of "subjective, i.e., non-reviewable selection [sic] cri-
teria"' 9 was unlawful.
Despite its broad holding that the use of subjective criteria was
unlawful, in reviewing the case of an individual female plaintiff, the
Commission's review was limited to determining whether these cri-
14. Id. at 521 (citation omitted).
15. [19731 EEOC DEc. (CCH) 6330 (Dec. 27, 1971).
16. Id. at 4591.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4592.
[Vol. 21:45
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teria had been applied fairly The bank claimed that the individual
charging party had been demoted and transferred out of the trust
department because of her poor supervisory ability and customer
relations. The Commission investigated these allegations and con-
cluded that the bank had acted "out of a prejudice against the
ability of females to supervise other females."20 It found that the
charging party's difficulties in getting along with her subordinates
and superiors were due to their resentment of a woman in a position
of authority Finally, because the bank had the burden of showing
that it had not engaged in discrimination, the EEOC held that the
three anonymous phone calls that the bank claimed to have received
did not support the bank's conclusion that the charging party had
poor customer relations. Thus, the EEOC implicitly acknowledged
that subjective conclusions that a person has poor supervisory abil-
ity or customer relations can serve as legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for demotion and transfer. The thrust of its decision is that
such determinations must be made honestly
In Leisner v. New York Telephone Co.,21 a court condemned the
application of arbitrary or unfair employment standards to women.
In Leisner, the female plaintiffs alleged that the New York Tele-
phone Company discriminated against women in placement into
management positions. The women showed that the defendant's
female managers were concentrated in the lowest levels of manage-
ment and within certain traditionally female jobs, such as chief
operator. The company applied both objective and subjective cri-
teria in evaluating its managerial candidates; it considered each
candidate's job interest and experience, educational degree, the re-
sults of various objective tests designed to test for leadership ability,
and performance evaluations done by the candidate's immediate
supervisor. Finally, as the company's personnel manager testified:
"we stand back and look at the individual as a total individual, and,
'Is this person going to be successful in our business?' becomes our
final criterion after we have all of these factors reviewed. 2 2 The
company used a Management Development Program to determine
whether employees had the aptitude for upper level management.
Although approximately 38% of the company's management level
20. Id.
21. 358 F Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Id. at 365.
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employees were women,23 only 6% of the participants in the Man-
agement Development Program were women during the two-year
period prior to trial.24 Company interviewers had considerable dis-
cretion in determining whether applicants had the potential for the
development program. That the company considered military but
not teaching experience to be indicative of leadership ability also
was established.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a preliminary injunction against the defendant because
it doubted that the company would be able to show that its criteria
were valid at the trial for the permanent injunction. The court found
that some of the defendant's criteria were arbitrary For example,
the defendant's personnel officer
was asked how he knew that experience as a military officer was
more valuable than experience as a teacher. He replied, "I guess
I'm paid to make this type of judgment." He testified that no
studies or evaluation had been made to validate this judgment.2
The court suspected, moreover, that when the company's criteria
were valid, they were applied unfairly to women." Thus, in Leisner,
as in Kohn and the EEOC decision, subjective criteria were not
condemned because they were subjective, but because they were
arbitrary or had been applied unfairly
In Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, "7 the plaintiff pre-
vailed because he showed that the defendant had not acted in ac-
cordance with the defendant's own subjective evaluation of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff, Marquez, was a Mexican-American engi-
neer who claimed that he had been discriminatorily denied promo-
tion. The court found that Marquez had been rated as excellent
by his superiors and had been eligible for promotion for fifteen
years. Marquez never had received a promotion and in 1963 his
23. Id. at 363.
24. Id. at 364.
25. Id. at 369.
26. The court observed:
Given the wide discretion that interviewers and supervisors have to measure the
"total person" and to waive some criteria if other criteria are satisfied, it is
possible that, at least in some cases, the criteria have been applied more strin-
gently with respect to women.
Id.
27. 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 21:45
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name had been removed from the eligibility list for no apparent
reason.28 Again, in Marquez, subjective evaluation was not the
cause of the plaintiff's success; the defendant's unfair application
led to the finding of discrimination.
When subjective criteria have been used fairly and in a safe-
guarded procedure. the courts and the EEOC have expressly ap-
proved the use of such criteria. In Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.," the court rejected a black computer operator's claim that
he was paid a lower salary than whites and denied entrance into
programmer training because of discrimination. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the
defendant's promotion system, which was partially subjective, was
not discriminatory because it contained procedural safeguards and
had been fairly applied:
[T]he criteria are written, the ratings are discussed with the
employee, who may register a complaint with the corporation's
equal opportunity officers if he or she thinks the rating unfair,
and the ratings are reviewed by at least two other supervisors.
Of greater significance in this case, there has been no showing
that defendant discriminated among employees in applying these
criteria. On the contrary, defendant has shown that another
black operator was promoted to programmer trainee prior to
plaintiffs request for transfer, based m part on his outstanding
performance ratings.30
Thus, the employer rebutted a claim of discrimination by showing
the fairness of its employment procedure. The procedure was safe-
guarded against discrimination by written guidelines, review, and
opportunity for appeal. Additionally, the employer produced an
28. The court applied the defendant's own subjective standards to conclude that Marquez
had been a victim of discrimination:
The undisputed and documented proof relating to Marquez's outstanding job
characteristics, the record of no promotion for Marquez since 1956, the undis-
puted evidence that several men of equal caliber had received promotions and
had been assigned additional job training programs throughout these years, the
unexplained removal of Marquez from a promotional status in 1963, the absence
of any rational reason for this removal and for his nonpromotion, and the
marked absence of minority employees in the district and region, constitute
substantial proof of racial discnminatibn in the instant case.
Id. at 1162.
29. 416 F Supp. 972 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
30. Id. at 982.
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individual similar to the plaintiff who had not been discriminated
against to dramatize to the court that its procedure was fair.
In Badillo v Dallas County Community Action Committee,
Inc.'31 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas approved the use of subjective criteria by a screening commit-
tee in accordance with the Office of Employment Opportunity
guidelines. In Badillo, a class of Mexican-Americans claimed that
the Dallas County Community Action Committee ("DAC") dis-
criminated against them in favor of blacks. One of the plaintiffs,
Robert Medrano, claimed that he had been discriminatorily denied
promotion to the position of Deputy Director of Field Services, the
second highest position in the DAC administration. Medrano
argued that he was more qualified than the man who had been
appointed to the position because of his work experience at DAC,
his command of two languages, and his contact with the Dallas
poverty community 32 The court considered Medrano's claim to be
without merit, largely because of the "objective, reasonable, consci-
entious job performed by the screening committee. ' '33 The screening
committee had selected ten finalists by randomly dividing all appli-
cations into five groups. Each committee member selected what he
or she considered to be the two outstanding applications in each
group. The finalists then were interviewed by the committee and
ranked numerically by each member. Eight clearly subjective cri-
teria were used as the basis of ranking:
1. Goals, objectives, priorities
2. Program plans and budgets
3. Organization
4. Leadership ability and potential
5. Administrative capabilities, including depth and length of
experience
6. Community support
7 Community change
8. Review and evaluation. 3
Because the court was convinced that these criteria were applied
31. 394 F Supp. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
32. Id. at 702.
33. Id.
34. Id.
[Vol. 21:45
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fairly, it did not find them objectionable on the basis of their subjec-
tivity Moreover, the court performed its own subjective evaluation
of the candidates to determine the fairness of the procedure. It
found that the successful candidate's "appearance at trial assured
the Court of his articulateness and leadership abilities. In view of
[the successful candidate's] impressive credentials, the Court
finds the screening committee's decision to be well founded. '3 5 As
in Thompson, the court in Badillo approved the fair use of subjec-
tive criteria.
The EEOC also has approved the use of subjective criteria. In
Decision 75-225 '6 the charging party, a black female social worker,
alleged that she was denied promotion on the basis of her sex. The
EEOC found that the charging party had been interviewed by three
males for the position of correctional manager. The male evaluators
testified that they had chosen the male applicant for the job because
while Charging Party did meet its qualification and experience
requirements, they were interested in someone who could effec-
tively carry out the functions of the newly created position.
Charging Party had strong reservations concerning even the es-
tablishment of the position, whereas the male had expressed a
very positive attitude about the job. 31
In holding this decision to be nondiscriminatory, the EEOC ex-
pressly endorsed at least some subjective evaluation:
We do not find it unreasonable for a prudent employer to con-
sider, among other things, a prospective candidate's enthusiasm
and attitude about the job sought and to eliminate from a group
of otherwise qualified candidates one or more who, arguably more
qualified indicated a genuine lack of interest in the job.3s
In the same decision, the EEOC indicated that limits exist to the
use of subjective evaluation; the employer could not fire the plaintiff
for her "negative and hostile" attitude when this attitude had been
displayed by going outside the chain of command to make her
EEOC complaint.39 When a subjective decision is made fairly and
is not retaliatory, the EEOC decision indicates that it will not be
35. Id.
36. 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6491 (1976).
37. Id. at 4258.
38. Id. (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 4259.
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found objectionable solely because it is subjective. Also worth not-
ing is that the EEOC apparently attached no weight to the fact that
this particular subjective evaluation of a female had been made by
an all-male panel.
The courts on occasion have deferred to subjective evaluations
without even the judicial "second look" taken in Badillo. In Olson
v. Philco-Ford'40 for example, the female plaintiff argued that she
was more qualified than the male who was selected to be Coordina-
tor of General Education at the defendant's plant. The plaintiff
argued that discrimination could be inferred from the lack of post-
ing of notice of the opening, the lack of a formal interview, and the
selection of a male by a panel of two males. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit refused to draw any inference of discrimina-
tion because the plaintiff had known of the opening and had been
interviewed for it. The court also stated that "[s]tanding alone,
selection by two males, one of whom would be her supervisor, will
not sustain a reasonable inference of discrimination." 4' Finally, the
court gave little weight to the plaintiff's subjectivity argument:
Further argument is that the reasons assigned by the Company
for [the male's] selection were subjective and a pretext. These
reasons were ability in leadership and public relations and
"demonstrated relationship with other staff members." Mrs.
Olson's answers are that she was better qualified. This in turn is
a subjective conclusion.42
In Morrow v. Crosby,4 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania similarly rejected a black plain-
tiff's contention that he was "overwhelmingly more qualified"44
than two successful white female applicants because "the proce-
dure followed throughout the selection process was fair and reason-
ably calculated to afford a conscientious consideration of each and
every applicant certified as eligible for promotion and was com-
pletely untainted by consideration of race or sex."" Among the cri-
teria for promotion was a personal evaluation by panel members of
40. 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 477.
42. Id.
43. 418 F Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
44. Id. at 936.
45. Id. at 937.
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the "applicants' inherent abilities and capabilities as displayed at
the interviews."46 In deciding that these evaluations were fair, the
court examined the make-up of the two panels involved. Both pan-
els contained two white males, a white female, and a black male.
The court was unconvinced that these panels were more likely to
choose females than males.
In Levens v. General Services Administration," the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri approved the use
of a one-man screening panel when the evaluator was "neutral and
experienced" and used four "customary and acceptable"48 evalua-
tion factors in making the evaluation. These factors included: "(1)
supervisory potential; (2) awards; (3) experience; and (4) job per-
formance."49 The court made no comment on the obvious subjectiv-
ity of at least two of these factors 0
Without discussing the merits of the use of subjective criteria, at
least some courts tacitly have accepted that the equal opportunity
laws do not require employees to promote or retain obnoxious peo-
ple. In Fogg v. New England Telephone Co.,5' for example, the
United States District Court of New Hampshire found that the
plaintiff had performed a "valuable public service" by bringing the
defendant's discriminatory practices to light.52 The court, however,
gave the plaintiff no relief except attorney's fees and costs because
it found that she would not have received a promotion in the ab-
sence of sex discrimination. The court found that "what the Com-
pany required at this management level was primarily conformity
and the ability to get along with other personnel. '53 Fogg did not
conform to these standards. To the contrary, she "had a knack for
stepping on her supervisors' toes if they got in her way She was an
aggressive, ambitious employee determined to push her way
46. Id.
47. 391 F Supp. 35 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
48. Id. at 36.
49. Id.
50. At the university level, the courts consistently hold that tenure and employment deci-
sions necessarily are based on subjective evaluations. So long as the courts find that these
decisions have been fairly made in accordance with reasonable criteria, they will not interfere.
See, e.g., Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976); Labat v. Board of
Educ. of New York, 401 F Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299
F Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
51. 346 F Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972).
52. Id. at 651.
53. Id. at 649.
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ahead."54 The court accepted Fogg's incompatibility with her em-
ployer's bureaucracy as a legitimate reason for denial of promotion.
Similarly, m Davis v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc.,55 the
court concluded that a black interior designer had not been discri-
minatorily denied promotion when the evidence showed her to be
"emotional, antagonistic, demanding, [and] unresponsive."56
This judicial acceptance of subjective evaluations of white collar
employees may be limited to levels of employment for which the
general public cannot be presumed to be qualified. At lower levels
of white collar employment, courts are apt to apply standards simi-
lar to those applied to blue collar employment. Smith v. Union Oil
Co.51 may illustrate the judicial approach to such lower level white
collar employment.
Smith was a class action brought by blacks and Spanish sur-
named Americans against the retail credit billing center of Union
Oil. The named plaintiff alleged that Union Oil discriminated in
hiring class members and in promoting class members to manage-
rial and supervisory positions. Promotions at the credit center were
based primarily on annual supervisory evaluations. When a vacancy
occurred, the personnel department58 reviewed candidates whom it
had identified or who had been recommended for promotion by their
supervisors. Employees had an opportunity to express their interest
in promotion at the annual review session. The center followed a
policy of promotion from within, but did not post vacancies. Based
on the plaintiffs' statistical showing, the court found that:
defendant's almost exclusively white managerial and supervi-
sorial staff controls the promotional process and that subjective
evaluations in this context and in conjunction with the policy of
"promotions from within" fosters "racial replication" of white
employee groups and disparity in promotion."
The court emphasized the defendant's employment practices in
holding that the plaintiffs had shown discrimination. In fact, the
court seemed to relegate the plaintiffs' statistical showing to second
54. Id.
55. 416 F Supp. 997 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
56. Id.
57. 17 FEP Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
58. The personnel department was all white until 1975.
59. Id. at 983.
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place in holding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
case. The court's opinion is worth quoting at length because of this
unusual de-emphasis of statistics. The court held that the plaintiffs
had established a prima facie case by showing:
(a) Defendant's preference for "word-of-mouth" recruitment
and referral hiring.
(b) Defendant's primary reliance, in hiring, placement, and
promotion, upon the subjective evaluations of a predominantly
white supervisorial and personnel staff,
(c) Defendant's lack of bidding for or posting of hiring and pro-
motional opportunities, and defendant's failure to distribute job
criteria and qualifications to employees.
(d) Defendant's utilization of subjective or equivocal criteria,
virtually without objective, validated tests, for hiring and/or pro-
motion into various positions.
(e) Defendant's occasional utilization of such job criteria with,
apparently, greater flexibility for Whites than for minorities (par-
ticularly with respect to direct hire into the "credit analyst" posi-
tion).
(f) Defendant's express policy preference for promotion-from-
within based at least in part on rn-position seniority (particularly
with respect to filling supervisorial positions)."o
The court in Smith did not order specific relief; it instructed the
parties to attempt to negotiate a settlement.
Although the court condemned the defendant's use of subjective
employment criteria, it accepted the use of such criteria in regard
to the promotion of a named plaintiff to the position of credit ana-
lyst, a higher level position than clerk. The named plaintiff claimed
that she had been discriminatorily denied this promotion. The de-
fendant contended that she had not been promoted because her
performance was inadequate: she spent excessive time talking on
the telephone and to her fellow employees; she lacked "sufficient
industry;" she was reluctant to help in other areas; and she had a
poor attitude toward supervision." The court accepted all of these
reasons as legitimate grounds for denial of a promotion. Smith thus
60. Id. at 992.
61. Id. at 987.
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cannot be read as a complete condemnation of subjectivity at every
level of white collar employment. Rather, like many of the other
white collar cases, it indicates that at least at higher levels, the real
test of the legality of white collar employment practices is whether
they are applied fairly
Objective Criteria in the White Collar Context
The leading case on objective employment criteria is the Supreme
Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.12 In Griggs, the Court
held that the defendant's use of tests and its imposition of a high
school degree requirement were discriminatory even though the
employer had not intended to discriminate. The basis of the Court's
holding was that the degree requirement and the use of the Won-
derlic and Bennet Mechanical Comprehension tests 3 dispropor-
tionately disqualified blacks for employment and promotion with-
out being job-related. After Griggs, employers cannot use tests or
objective requirements to "upgrade" the quality of their workforce
unless the tests or requirements are demonstrably related to the job
being tested for.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,6" the Court expanded on the
concept of job-relatedness and endorsed the EEOC's test validation
guidelines. The Court agreed with the EEOC that the message of
Griggs was:
that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by pro-
fessionally acceptable methods, to be "predictive of or signifi-
cantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which the
candidates are being evaluated."'"
The Court's favorable recognition of the EEOC's job validation
guidelines in Albemarle did not end the debate as to how employers
are to prove that their tests are job-related. Indeed, in Washington
62. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
63. The Court's discussion of the factual basis for its condemnation of the two tests was
rather casual. In a footnote, the Court noted that the EEOC had found in one case that "use
of a battery of tests, including the Wonderlic and Bennett tests resulted in 58% of whites
passing the tests, as compared with only 6% of the blacks." Id. at 430 n.6.
64. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
65. Id. at 431.
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v. Davis," the Court acknowledged that the problem was not likely
to be solved easily 67
In the white collar context, employers have had little difficulty in
showing the validity of standardized skills tests. Indeed, one court
noted that typing tests, when used to fill secretarial positions, are
the classic example of job-related tests. 8 Cases involving such tests
usually turn on whether the tests have been fairly administered. In
Smith v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway,69 for example, the plain-
tiff, a black female, charged that the defendant had administered
the Wonderlic and General Clerical tests in a discriminatory man-
ner.70 The defendant used both tests as pass-fail measures of appli-
cants for clerical jobs. The tests were administered in local offices
and graded in the defendant's personnel office in Springfield, Mis-
souri; the test graders did not know the race of the applicants. The
plaintiff took the two tests along with four white applicants in the
defendant's Birmingham, Alabama office. She passed the Won-
derlic test with the minimum score, but like all four white appli-
cants, she failed the General Clerical test.
The plaintiff claimed that the tests had been administered to her
unfairly and that they disproportionately excluded blacks without
being job-related. She also claimed that the white male who had
given the tests had harrassed her while she took them and had been
hostile to her while being unduly helpful and courteous to the
whites. From its review of the facts, the court concluded that the
tests had been administered fairly 71
The court found the tests to be free from adverse impact and to
66. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
67. In Washington, the Court noted: "It appears beyond doubt by now that there is no
single method for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship to job
performance." 422 U.S. at 247 n.13.
68. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971).
69. 397 F Supp. 580 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
70. The Wonderlic test is used to assess the general mental ability of industrial workers.
It is one of the most extensively used personnel screening devices; considerable normative
data on industrial samples have been accumulated through its implementation. A. ANASTASI,
PSYCHOLOGIcAL TESTING 440-41 (4th ed. 1976).
The General Clerical test is a widely-used occupational test designed to measure clerical
aptitude. Its emphasis, like other clerical tests, is on perceptual speed. Id. at 449, 716.
71. 397 F Supp. at 584. The court found that the plaintiff generally believed herself to be
a victim of discrimination. Her testimony of harrassment was not supported by the white
applicant who testified. Finally, the evidence showed that the defendant's office had an
excellent record of recruiting black employees.
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be job-related. It concluded that there was no adverse impact be-
cause the black failure rate on the tests was only .3% more than the
white failure rate.7 2 The court stated that it need not determine the
job-relatedness of the Wonderlic test because the plaintiff had
passed it. It found the General Clerical test to be valid because it
was "related in substantial measure to the successful completion of
the clerical training program"73 and to job performance. Although
the court had not determined the validity of the Wonderlic test, it
apparently approved its continued use when it stated that "the
evidence clearly and unrebuttably demonstrates the validity of
these tests.""
In contrast, in Hester v. Southern Railway,75 the defendant's use
of typing tests as part of the defendant's entire hiring process was
held to constitute an unlawful employment practice. The defen-
dant's employment process consisted of a battery of tests and a
subjective interview First, it gave applicants a pass-fail SRA (Sci-
ence Research Associates) typing test. It then gave applicants SRA
verbal and non-verbal tests and the J.P Cleaver self-description
test. On appeal, the defendant argued that the latter three tests
were not used as pass-fail hurdles, but rather as "informational
inputs in evaluation of the applicants."7 The final step in the defen-
dant's hiring process was an entirely subjective interview with its
white male personnel officer. Conceding that the plaintiff's evidence
was "weak and in some respects inconclusive,"77 the district court
nevertheless held that the plaintiff had established that the proce-
dure had a disparate impact on blacks 78 and enjoined the defen-
72. 77.5% of black applicants failed the test whereas 77.2% of white applicants failed. Id.
at 583.
73. Id. at 584.
74. Id.
75. 349 F Supp. 812 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 497 F.2d 1374 (5th
Cir. 1974).
76. 497 F.2d at 1375. It is unclear from the district court's opinion whether the defendant
raised this point at trial.
77. 349 F Supp. at 817.
78. The Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that the plaintiff's statistical showing did not
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The circuit court held that the plaintiff's
contention that 35-40% of the persons responding to the defendant's ads were black whereas
the percentage of blacks hired was far smaller was neither probative nor relevant. The court
reasoned that a number of applicants may have "deselected" themselves before going through
the entire process. Thus, any inference of discrimination was entirely conjectural. 497 F.2d
at 1380.
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dant's entire hiring process without attempting to condemn any
component. The court did not distinguish between the objective and
subjective -measures, or between the pass-fail typing test and the
"informational inputs."
In a more reasoned opinion, the Eighth Circuit condemned the
use of homemade skills tests for clerical workers, In United States
v. N.L. Industries, Inc.,7" the district court had held that two of the
individual plaintiffs justifiably had been denied clerical employ-
ment because they had failed the defendant's homemade math and
dictation tests. The Eighth Circuit held that these tests were an
unacceptable employment practice because they were not devel-
oped professionally and because they were administered in an un-
standardized manner. The math test consisted of four or five prob-
lems jotted down on a sheet of yellow paper."0 The dictation test
consisted of five minutes of reading from a foreman's manual
"which the supervisor 'ordinarily' dictated at 80 words per min-
ute."'" The Eighth Circuit struck down the tests in language which
suggests it would have been less critical of standardized tests:
The homemade tests administered by the Company certainly
permit vast fluctuation in both their content and administration.
It hardly required the expertise of a psychometrist to perceive
that the difficulty of the problems or the speed of the dicta-
tion are within the complete subjective control of the indi-
vidual examiner. In addition, National Lead has not shown that
the examiner possessed any expertise in testing, that the test was
in any way standardized, nor even that the hired applicants per-
formed more satisfactorily than the rejected black applicants.82
The Eighth Circuit's opinion clearly indicates that the defendant's
skills tests are illegal because they are disguised forms of subjective,
discriminatory evaluation. This condemnation of unstandardized
tests is similar to a Tenth Circuit opinion in which in a blue collar
context, that court stated that "[Tlitle VII prohibits informal
testing procedures which might discriminate against minority
groups.' "'
79. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 371.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 372.
83. Brito v. Zia Corp., 478 F.2d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 1973).
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Predictably, for employers to validate tests which, like the Won-
derlic, are not skill tests has been more difficult. In Young v. Edg-
comb Steel Co.," a black male alleged that he had been discrimina-
torily denied promotion from shear operator to inside salesman.
The defendant used the Wonderlic test as a pass-fail measure of
promotional applicants. Persons who passed the Wonderlic then
were interviewed. The plaintiff failed the Wonderlic and never was
interviewed. Without requiring evidence of the effect of the test on
the defendant's workforce, the court concluded that the Wonderlic
had a disparate effect on blacks. The basis of the court's finding was
a study performed by the Wonderlic Company independently of
the litigation, and the court's own observation that "the discrimi-
natory impact of the Wonderlic Test has been widely noted particu-
larly in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. ",85 The plaintiff had contended that the test had been
administered in a discriminatory manner, but this proved to be un-
necessary to his case. The court found that the Wonderlic had not
been shown to be job-related and enjoined the defendant from its
further use.
Despite the district court's readiness to condemn the Wonderlic
on the most generalized kind of evidence, it apparently was not
unsympathetic to the defendant's need to screen candidates for the
sales job. The court denied individual relief to the plaintiff, noting
that:
Johnie Young's complaint to the E.E.O.C. shows that he has a
limited command of the written English language. It is character-
ized by frequent misspellings and use of poor grammar and im-
proper punctuation. Such writing would be totally unacceptable
in correspondence with customers from inside salesmen on behalf
of the defendant corporation. In testifying, Young demonstrated
a difficulty in understanding and pronouncing the names of his
co-workers. For instance, he repeatedly pronounced the name of
Herbert McCorkle as "McCormick." He did this despite having
known and dealt with McCorkle for at least six years. This inabil-
ity to deal with people verbally by perceiving and using their
correct names further disqualifies Young as an inside salesman."
84. 363 F Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 499 F.2d 97 (4th Cir.
1974).
85. 363 F Supp. at 965-66. In an effort to meet this problem, Wonderlic published a
separate collection of black norms in 1972. A. ANASTAsi, supra note 70, at 441.
86. Id. at 971-72.
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of individual
relief, holding that the court could not devise its own standards for
job applicants. Rather, it held that the defendant had to reevaluate
Young using "nondiscriminatory, objective, job related stan-
dards. ' 8 7 A company witness had testified that what the company
wanted of its inside salesmen were "people who displayed diplo-
macy, intelligence, patience, initiative, attention to detail, and abil-
ity to work under stress." 88 The Fourth Circuit did not elucidate how
the company was to devise objective standards to find these people.
The judicial recognition that some white collar employees must
possess skills which cannot easily be quantified or measured may
make validation of tests for higher level employees more difficult.
Chance v. Board of Examiners"9 involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to New York's examination procedure for candidates for su-
pervisory positions in the public schools. These positions included
principal, assistant principal, and administrative assistant. Al-
though Gnggs did not control this fourteenth amendment suit, the
court concluded that the defendant had the burden of showing the
tests to be job-related once the plaintiffs had shown a substantial
disparate impact. The court confessed that it had doubted initially
whether valid examinations could be devised to test supervisory
ability 10 Apparently, neither party was willing to argue that New
87. 499 F.2d at 100.
88. Id.
89. 330 F Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affl'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
90. The court expressed its doubts as follows:
At the outset of the hearings, being inexperienced in the field of examinations
generally, we indicated doubt as to whether examinations could be constructed
that would be valid for selection of Principals and other supervisory personnel,
since we viewed their duties as being executive and complex in nature, with the
success of a Principal in a given school depending not so much on his knowedge
of duties and educational content courses given by his subordinates as on such
intangible factors as leadership skill, sensitivity to the feelings and attitudes of
teachers, parents and children, and ability to articulate, to relate, to organize
work, to establish procedures, to promote good community relations, to induce
subordinates to accept directions, to work cooperatively, to criticize without
creating unnecessary animosity or ill-will, to analyze and evaluate administra-
tive problems, to take decisive action when required, to operate under stress, to
initiate and promote new programs, and to instill a feeling of confidence. In
short, we questioned whether tests that might be valid for purposes of determin-
ing a candidate's knowledge of the duties of a position or of detailed educational
information would be valid for purposes of determining his judgment and ability
as an executive, particularly since the candidate, being a licensed teacher, has
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York should abandon its examination procedures in favor of an
entirely subjective selection process. The court concluded that al-
though the exams "may have weaknesses in testing for higher level
executive positions" they are "essential tools in selecting supervi-
sory personnel.""1
The court found the plaintiffs attacks on the validity of the tests
to be confirmed by its own examination of the test questions.2 Al-
though confessing reluctance to invade the field of educational test-
ing, the court concluded that the defendant's tests did not measure
what it perceived to be supervisorial qualifications. Rather, the
court determined
that the questions appear to be aimed at testing the candidate's
ability to memorize rather than the qualities normally associated
with a school administrator The ability to memorize and
regurgitate laundry lists of bad answers is not, we hope, a true
test of a candidate's qualifications for a supervisory position.13
The court was sufficiently convinced that these examinations were
not job-related to grant a preliminary injunction against their use.
Its ruling was affirmed by the Second Circuit. 4
The case law reveals a general judicial acceptance of standard-
ized, fairly administered skills tests. The courts are less receptive
to tests which attempt to measure other kinds of personal attri-
butes. Young and Chance may represent a general judicial skepti-
cism that objective tests can measure the subjective qualifications
which they perceive to be necessary for higher level white collar
jobs, or indeed, for any jobs which require dealing with people
rather than paper. Thus, whereas an employer who administers
typing and clerical tests may have to show only that his procedure
was fair, an employer who is attempting to use tests to measure
other qualities may have an almost insurmountable burden if his
tests are shown to have a disparate effect.
already demonstrated his or her technical skills in certain fields of education,
including ability to read, write, and speak English.
330 F Supp. at 217.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 220.
93. Id. at 221.
94. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF DISCRIMINATION
Relevant Statistical Comparisons
In its landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," the Su-
preme Court ruled that Title VII prohibits employment practices
which have an adverse impact on members of a protected class and
which are not justified by business necessity Statistical compari-
sons are necessarily the central form of proof in a Griggs-type, ad-
verse impact case. In Teamsters v. United States,"8 the Court ac-
knowledged the value of statistical proof as an indicator of disparate
treatment.97 The effect of the Court's acceptance of statistical proof
as a central element of discrimination suits has been to give such
proof an increasingly common and important role. The Court's anal-
ysis of statistical proof has become more sophisticated since Griggs.
Nevertheless, the Court has refrained from enunciating specific
guidelines for the use of such proof and has left it to lower courts to
formulate rules for the use of statistical proof.
The impact of an employer's practices on a particular race or sex
can be determined by using any one of three types of comparisons.
First, general population statistics can be used to compare the per-
centage of protected class members who are adversely affected by
an employment practice with the percentages of whites- or males
who are similarly affected. Second, the percentage of protected class
members on an employer's workforce can be compared to the per-
centage of class members in the relevant labor market. Third, a
court can measure the effect of an employer's practices by examin-
ing its actual effect on the employer's own workforce or applicant
pool. The Supreme Court has endorsed all three modes of compari-
son.
1. General Population Statistics
The first statistical mode of proof was accepted by the Supreme
Court in Griggs. The Court held that the defendant's high school
diploma requirement had a disparate impact on blacks. Without
discussing the geographical community from which the defendant
95. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
96. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
97. Id. at 339-40 n.20.
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hired, the Court based its holding on 1960 United States census
figures which showed that only 12% of North Carolina black males
had high school diplomas whereas 34% of North Carolina white
males had such diplomas.18 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the va-
lidity of this type of statistical comparison in Dothard v
Rawlinson.9 In Dothard, the Court found that Alabama's minimum
height-weight requirements for its prison guards had a disparate
impact on women. The Court justified its reliance on generalized
national statistics by noting that there was "no reason to suppose
that physical height and weight characteristics of Alabama men and
women differ markedly from those of the national population."110
More significantly, the Court in Dothard explained why examina-
tion of general population statistics rather than of the actual effect
of the defendant's requirements on its applicants was appropriate:
There is no requirement that a statistical showing of dispro-
portionate impact must always be based on analysis of the char-
acteristics of actual applicants The application process
itself might not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant
pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from
applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very
standards challenged as being discriminatory 101
Thus, Dothard indicates that general population statistics may be
appropriate for comparison in certain types of cases.
The Supreme Court's decision this year in New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, °" may indicate that the Court is retreating
from its endorsement of general population statistics and that it
may increasingly require plaintiffs to demonstrate the effect of chal-
lenged practices on the employer's actual workforce or applicant
pool. Beazer involved a fourteenth amendment challenge by a class
of methadone users to the New York City Transit Authority's
("TA") policy against hiring methadone users. The class included
all methadone users without regard to race or ethnic origin. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that TA's policy constituted a violation of the due process and
98. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
99. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
100. Id. at 330.
101. Id.
102. 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979).
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equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment."3
Almost a year after its original decision, the district court held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorney's fees under
Title VII 4 because TA's policy had an adverse impact on blacks
and Hispanics." 5 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's constitutional holding without reaching the statutory
issue. '6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari not only because
both lower courts had departed from the rule of judicial decision-
making that statutory issues be resolved before constitutional is-
sues, but also because of the Court's concern that the Title VII
issues had been wrongly decided.' The district court had based its
conclusion that TA's methadone policy had an adverse impact on
blacks and Hispanics on statistics which, in its view, showed that:
(1) of the employees referred to TA's medical consultant for sus-
pected violation of the drug policy, 81% were black or Hispanic; and
(2) between 62% and 65% of all methadone users in New York City
are black or Hispanic."'
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that
either the plaintiffs' statistics were insufficiently probative to estab-
lish a prima facie case or, if they did establish a prima facie case,
TA had rebutted the case by showing the business necessity of its
policy The Court placed great emphasis on the need for proof about
the actual effect of the defendant's practices. The opinion is unusual
because it did not indicate that the defendant provided statistics
about the effects of its policy on its workforce."' Rather, in finding
the plaintiffs' showing inadequate, the Court appeared to rely to a
great degree on its own doubts and speculations as to whether the
plaintiffs' statistics reflected the actual effect of the employment
practice.
The Court held that the figure as to the percentage of blacks and
Hispanics referred to the medical consultant for suspected use of
drugs was not probative of the alleged Title VII violation because
103. 399 F Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1974).
105. 414 F Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
106. 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit affirmed the award of attorney's fees
under The Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
107. 99 S. Ct. at 1358.
108. Id. at 1362.
109. The defendant did introduce evidence as to the percentage of methadone maintained
persons who are employable.
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"that statistic tells us nothing about the racial composition of the
employees suspected of using methadone."110 In footnote, the Court
stated that methadone users likely were not included in the group
referred to the medical consultant because methadone users do not
display physical manifestations of drug abuse."'
The Court also held that the district court erroneously had in-
ferred adverse impact from the statistic that 63-65% of the
methadone-maintained persons in New York City are black or His-
panic. The Court found this statistic to be insufficiently probative
because it failed to reveal the effect of the policy on TA's applicant
pool:
We do not know, however, how many of these persons ever worked
or sought to work for TA. This statistic therefore reveals little if
anything about the racial composition of the class of TA job
applicants and employees receiving methadone treatment. More
particularly, it tells us nothing about the class of otherwise-
qualified applicants and employees who have participated in
methadone maintenance programs for over a year-the only class
improperly excluded by TA's policy under the District Court's
analysis. The record demonstrates, in fact, that the figure is vir-
tually irrelevant because a substantial portion of the persons in-
cluded in it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the
illicit use of drugs and alcohol-or have received successful assis-
tance in finding jobs with employers other than TA."'2
The Court's unwillingness to infer adverse impact from general pop-
ulation statistics undercuts its affirmation of the utility of such
statistics in Dothard. Indeed, in a footnote it acknowledges Dothard
in so limited a manner as to virtually demolish the opinion:
Although "a statistical showing of disproportionate impact need
not always be based on an analysis of the characteristics of actual
applicants, evidence showing that the figures for the general
population might not accurately reflect the pool of qualified job
applicants" undermines the significance of such figures."3
One of the most intriguing aspects of Beazer was the type of
"evidence" accepted by the Court as sufficient to show that the
110. Id. at 1365.
111. Id. at 1365 n.26.
112. Id. at 1365-66.
113. Id. at 1366 n.29 (citation to Dothard omitted).
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general population statistics might not reflect adequately the pool
of qualified job applicants. As far as is reflected in the opinion, the
defendant did not produce statistics about its actual applicant
pool."' Nevertheless, the Court speculated that the plaintiffs' fig-
ures that 63-65% of methadone users are black or Hispanic might
be inaccurate because they did not include the 14,000 methadone
users who were enrolled in private clinics."' The-Court pointed out
that in the unlikely event that all 14,000 of these people were white,
the overall percentage of black and Hispanic methadone users
would be only 40% compared to the 36.3% of the total population
of New York that is black or Hispanic."' The Court concluded that
the plaintiffs' showing was weak and that, if it did establish a prima
facie case, that case had been rebutted by the defendant's showing
of business necessity Thus, the Court hedged on the question of
whether the plaintiffs' statistics were adequate to establish a prima
facie case.
If Beazer reflects the Court's current thinking on the use of statis-
tics in Title VII cases, it may spell the end of plaintiffs' ability to
prove their cases by showing the theoretical impact of an employer's
practices on the general population. Beazer may well indicate that,
in the future, plaintiffs will be forced to show the actual impact of
employment practices on identifiable people. To draw confident
conclusions from Beazer, however, would be premature. The Court's
ruling as to whether the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case is
ambiguous. Beazer is also troubling because it is not a "typical"
Title VII case; the Title VII claims were brought only as an after-
thought. More importantly, Beazer involved strong considerations
of public safety and rather weak showings as to the employability
of methadone users. Thus, although Beazer gives defendants am-
munition against general population statistics, that Beazer has
effectively overruled Dothard cannot yet be concluded.
Whatever the remaining vitality of the Griggs-Dothard method of
comparison, the method is of limited utility to plaintiffs, especially
at upper levels of employment. First, the method can be useful only
114. In his dissent, Justice White stated that TA could not complain about "the makeup
of the applicant pool since they refused on grounds of irrelevancy to allow discovery of
the racial background of the applicants denied employment pursuant to the methadone rule."
Id. at 1373.
115. The number of methadone users in New York City totalled 40,000 at the time.of trial.
116. Id. at 1366 n.30.
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when the challenged practice is a flat employment prerequisite, the
effect of which can be measured through general population statis-
tics. Second, general population statistics are also vulnerable, par-
ticularly after Hazelwood, to defendants' objections that the statis-
tics do not reflect the effect of its requirements on the labor pool
actually available to it. For example, a defendant might argue that
general state-wide statistics as to the percentage of blacks with high
school diplomas do not mirror the percentage of such blacks in the
age group and geographic area from which its applicants come."17
Finally, the courts may be unwilling to permit use of this analysis
at higher levels of white collar employment.
In Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center,"8 the Second
Circuit refused to apply a Griggs analysis to a bachelor of science
degree requirement for the job of medical technician in a blood
bank. In Townsend, the plaintiff, a black female, had performed
satisfactorily her duties as a medical technician at the county medi-
cal center for two years before the center imposed the B.S. require-
ment. As an incumbent, Townsend was allowed to attempt to pass
the examination for her position even though she did not hold the
degree. When she failed the examination, she was discharged along
with three white employees. Later, Townsend was rehired into a
lower-paying job classification. She brought suit, arguing that the
college degree requirement had a disparate impact on blacks and
was not job-related. The district court ordered provisional reinstate-
ment of Townsend in the medical technician position and that she
be given the opportunity to retake the examination.
The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the general popu-
lation statistics presented by Townsend were inadequate to show
that the degree requirement had an adverse impact on blacks. The
court based its holding on two grounds. First, it read Griggs very
narrowly, apparently holding that general population statistics can
be used to show disparate effect only in particularly egregious situa-
tions. Second, the court appeared to accord special status to college
degree requirements. In footnote, the court stated that the relevance
of general population statistics in Griggs had been
117. But see Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1974)
(rejecting the defendant's effort to limit the statistical showing to the Houston area on the
basis of the "recognized mobility of today's black labor force.").
118. 558 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1977).
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not to establish the prima facie case of discrimination which had
already been made, but to demonstrate that the racially dispar-
ate impact on defendant employer's workforce which was
otherwise established, was due to the challenged job requirement,
and not to some other practice of the employer or other cause."'
The court indicated that general population statistics could not be
used in most disparate impact cases. The court distinguished the
cases relied on by the plaintiff from the situation before it:
Neither Griggs nor Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
or United States v. Georgia Power Co., relied upon by
[Townsend], support the proposition that statistical evidence
concerning only the general population is sufficient to demon-
strate that a job prerequisite "operates to exclude" minorities. In
all of these cases plaintiffs established that virtually no blacks
were in fact able to satisfy the challenged job qualification and
obtain employment with the defendant.'20
Having read Griggs so narrowly, the court held that the Griggs use
of statistics could not be applied appropriately to a challenge to a
college degree requirement.
The Second Circuit commented that permitting the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case on the basis of general population statis-
tics in this case would put a burden of showing job-relatedness of
degree requirements on every employer who imposes such require-
ments. This, the court was not willing to do:
We do not believe that a statistic relating only to the general
population, and not to the employment practices of the particular
defendant, should be sufficient to raise such a presumption
against a college degree requirement. The requirement of a col-
lege degree, particularly in the sciences, seems to be in the mod-
ern day of advanced scientific method, a neutral requirement for
the protection of the public.'
The court conceded that degree requirements conceivably could
serve as pretexts for discrimination, but declined to put all employ-
ers who impose such requirements in the position of bearing the
burden of proving them job-related whenever they are challenged on
the basis of general population statistics.
119. Id. at 120 n.6.
120. Id. at 120 (citations omitted) (emphasis orginal).
121. Id.
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2. Available Workforce Statistics
The second method of statistical analysis is similar to the first in
that it measures the effect of a defendant's practices by looking to
general community statistics. Under this second method, the per-
centage of protected class members in the defendant's workforce is
measured against the percentage of protected class members in the
available workforce. The Supreme Court explained the rationale for
this type of analysis in Teamsters:
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that non-
discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic compositon
of the population in the community from which employees are
hired. Evidence of long-lasting and gross disparity between the
composition of a work force and that of the general population
thus may be significant even though § 703(j) makes clear that
Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the
general population.2 '
The difficulty posed by this type of comparison is to determine the
size and membership of the relevant labor market.
In Hazelwood, the Court made clear that general population sta-
tistics do not mirror the actual availability of protected class mem-
bers when the job in question requires special skills not possessed
by the general population. The Court stated that in Hazelwood,
unlike Teamsters, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie
case merely by showing that the percentage of black Hazelwood
teachers was lower than the percentage of blacks in the Hazelwood
community The Court explained:
In Teamsters, the comparison between the percentage of Negroes
on the employer's work force and the percentage in the general
areawide population was highly probative, because the job skill
there involved-the ability to drive a truck-is one that many
persons possess or can fairly readily acquire. When special quali-
fications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the
general population (rather than to the smaller group of individu-
als who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little pro-
bative value.' =
122. 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
123. 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
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In HazeIwood, the defendant's requirement that its teachers have
teaching certificates was not challenged as discriminatory In other
cases in which a court accepts the defendant's employment prere-
quisites as valid, a plaintiff will have to base his statistical compari-
sons on the percentage of qualified protected class members in the
relevant labor market.
In the white collar context, whether a court will require a showing
based on qualified protected class members will depend on whether
it views the defendant's job qualifications as more analogous to the
teaching certificate requirement of Hazelwood or the truck-driving
ability requirement of Teamsters. In Hester v. Southern Railway, '"
the Fifth Circuit held that general population statistics were not
probative when the job in question, that of data typist, required the
ability to type sixty words per minute. Similarly, in Thompson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.,1 5 the position in question was that of
computer programmer, and the court limited the statistical compar-
ison to minorities possessing the relevant minimal qualifications.
In Patterson v. American Tobacco Co.,' 2 the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered whether a district court had properly imposed a quota for
hiring blacks and women into supervisory positions. The circuit
court held that imposition of the quota was improper by comparing
the defendant's recent supervisory hiring with the percentage of
black and female supervisory personnel in the Richmond Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area ("SMSA"). The court stated that the
supervisory statistics "furnish a more realistic measure of the com-
pany's conduct than the gross percentage of blacks and women in
the whole workforce, including unskilled labor."'27 The court did not
address the issue of whether use of supervisory statistics might have
the effect of locking in discrimination.
When the defendant's employment prerequisites themselves are
challenged as discriminatory and innecessary, the court will not
limit the market comparison to persons possessing those qualifica-
tions. In Spurlock v. United Airlines, 28 for example, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case simply
by showing the miniscule number of black flight officers employed
124. 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
125. 416 F Supp. 972 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1977).
126. 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
127. Id. at 275.
128. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
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by United. The court rejected United's argument that its workforce
should be measured against the percentage of qualified blacks in the
market because United's qualifications were challenged as discrimi-
natory The airline's argument was weakened because it occasion-
ally had waived at least one of its own requirements and it had
trained its own flight officers. This second fact meant that the
entry-level qualifications of United's officers were less critical than
they otherwise might have been.
Smith v. Union Oil Co.'2' indicates that, at the lower range of
white collar employment, the courts are apt to accept general popu-
lation comparisons. In Smith, the defendant argued that its clerical
workforce should be measured against the percentage of minority
clerical workers in the applicable SMSA who are employed in the
fields of "Finance, Insurance & Real Estate" and "Manufacturing
-Non-durable goods." 130 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California rejected this attempt to limit
the market, reasoning that the defendant could not limit the com-
parative market to these particular fields because the defendant
was not engaged in manufacturing and because the clerical work
in the field of finance was "somewhat more specialized than
defendant's own operations."' 3 ' The court, however, went further
and rejected the defendant's efforts to limit the relevant market
to clerical workers. It advanced two reasons for preferring general
population statistics. First, it suggested that clerical skills can be
acquired readily by the general population. Second, the court sug-
gested that so limiting the market might tend to freeze the status
quo and "to keep employable but unemployed minorities out of the
workforce particularly in the case of clerical work where
'qualifications' are unlikely to present a significant barrier.' ' 32 The
court in Smith's refusal to accept a narrowing of general population
statistics appears to go somewhat beyond the rationale of
Teamsters. The court's notion is not just that most members of the
population could perform the job, but that Title VII contemplates
that employers will reach affirmatively into the general population
to teach skills to minority members.
129. 17 FEP Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
130. Id. at 967.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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At upper levels of white collar employment, Hazelwood offers
employers an excellent chance to limit the size of the market against
which their workforce is compared. For example, in Presseisen v.
Swarthmore College, 33 the plaintiffs challenged on the ground of sex
discrimination the college's hiring of senior faculty members. The
plaintiffs showed that no woman ever had been appointed at the
initial rank of assistant professor or above. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that this
did not establish a prima facie case because the plaintiffs had not
shown the relevant labor market. 34 Significantly, the court believed
that the relevant labor market could be shown by the percentage of
female faculty at "other small liberal arts colleges comparable to
Swarthmore."'35 With respect to overall faculty hiring, because the
plaintiffs could not show that Swarthmore employed fewer women
than comparable institutions, 36 the court held that no prima facie
case of discrimination had been established. In contrast to Smith,
the court m Pressetsen apparently was uninfluenced by fears of
freezing the status quo. The Pressetsen opinion indicates that, when
a job requires sufficiently high qualifications, defendants may be
able to point to the general absence of protected class members in
such positions as indicative of a small relevant labor market.
In addition to recognizing the propriety of limiting the members
of the relevant labor market to qualified persons, Hazelwood opened
the door to a fine-tuned focus on the geographical size of that mar-
ket. In Griggs, the Supreme Court had taken a casual approach to
the geographical size of the labor market; the court accepted, appar-
ently without analysis, that state-wide high school diploma figures
were relevant to Duke Power Company's hiring practices. This ap-
proach to geographic scope may have influenced decisions such as
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,' in which the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected the employer's argument that its relevant labor market
was blacks between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four who lived
in the immediate Houston area. The court rejected age limitations
133. 442 F Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
134. Id. at 625.
135. Id. at 621.
136. Id. The court regarded Swarthmore's percentage of 19.8% women in 1974-75 compared
with a nationwide percentage of 22-24% and of 20% women in 1975-76 with a nationwide
percentage of 23-25% as indicative of a lack of discrimination.
137. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
on the ground that accepting such a limit on relevant statistics
would contravene the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.'38
Without indicating the factual basis for its conclusion, the court
stated:
Goodyear's geographic and age limitations conveniently ignore
the recognized mobility of today's black labor force and the ob-
vious fact that the potential labor pool cannot be limited to one
particular age group. A "young" black individual, whether age 25
or 45, is a potential employee in a Goodyear plant. Moreover, a
black individual in rural Texas today, may be an active partici-
pant in the Houston labor pool tomorrow ,31
The Court's opinion in Hazelwood should end this conclusory ap-
proach to geographical labor markets.
In Hazelwood, the Court held that it was important to determine
whether the relevant labor market was St. Louis County alone, as
argued by the defendant, or the county including the City of St.
Louis, as argued by the Government. The Court ordered the district
court to determine this issue on remand and suggested a number of
factors that would be relevant to its determination:
(i) whether the racially based hiring policies of the St. Louis
City School District were in effect as far back as 1970, the year
in which the census figures were taken; (ii) to what extent those
policies have changed the racial composition of that district's
teaching staff from what it would otherwise have been; (iii) to
what extent St. Louis' recruitment policies have diverted to the
city, teachers who might otherwise have applied to Hazelwood;
(iv) to what extent Negro teachers employed by the city would
prefer employment in other districts such as Hazelwood; and (v)
what the experience in other school districts in St. Louis County
indicates about the validity of excluding the City School District
from the relevant labor market.'4
Noticeably absent from the Court's discussion was recognition of
"the recognized mobility of today's black labor market."
Smith v. Union Oil Co. '" indicates the increased attention which
litigants should pay to geography after Hazelwood. In Smith, the
138. Id. at 1371 n.11. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970).
139. 491 F.2d at 1371 (footnote omitted).
140. 433 U.S. at 312 (footnote omitted).
141. 17 FEP Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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parties expended considerable effort on suggesting various groups
for the court's comparison. The plaintiffs suggested that the rele-
vant geographic market was the entire San Francisco-Oakland
SMSA. The plaintiffs also suggested that this comparison be
weighted to reflect that the defendant actually hired more appli-
cants from the City of San Francisco. which has a greater percen-
tage of blacks than the SMSA. The defendant argued that, because
anyone in the SMSA could work for it, the straight SMSA percen-
tages should be used. The court was able to avoid actually deciding
between the two figures because they did not affect its findings.
Nevertheless, the court considered the plaintiff's SMSA percen-
tages to be somewhat more persuasive than the defendants' 4I
In United States v. County of Fairfax,' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that comparison
to the Washington, D.C. SMSA was inappropriate for judging the
hiring policies of the County of Fairfax, Virginia. The court based
its determination on practical factors which led it to believe that
"[t]he District of Columbia . . is just not an area from which the
defendants can be expected to draw any significant number of their
employees."'' As reasons for this conclusion, the court stated:
The distances involved, the lack of convenient available public
transportation and the fact that salaries paid by the County and
the other defendant agencies are lower than those paid by District
of Columbia employers, most notably the federal government, are
factors which dictate this conclusion. The distance and transpor-
tation factors also prohibit the Maryland subdivisions [of the
SMSA] from being considered noteworthy sources of employ-
ment.'
3. Applicant Flow and Internal Statistics
The third method of statistical comparison entails examination
of the defendant's black/white or male/female hire or promotion
ratios. The Fifth Circuit has characterized this as the "most direct
route to proof of racial discrimination in hiring.""'4 The Supreme
142. Id. at 968.
143. 19 FEP Cas. 753 (E.D. Va. 1979).
144. Id. at 757.
145. Id.
146. Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Court employed this method in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody "I
This method has the obvious advantage over the other two of elimi-
nating the theoretical debate over the size of the relevant labor
market. Although it entails the fewest complications, the method is
not free from difficulty Applicant-hire statistics can minimize or
exaggerate the number of protected class members actually affected
by an employment practice. The Supreme Court in Dothard pointed
out the danger of underinclusiveness:
The application process itself might not adequately reflect the
actual potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people
might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized
inability to meet the very standards challenged as being discrimi-
natory 148
In the new Uniform Guidelines, the Government has noted the prob-
lem of exaggeration by stating that defendants can rebut a showing
of adverse impact by showing that they have an atypical number of
protected class applicants due to their special recruiting efforts. 4 '
Applicant flow statistics have been criticized as potentially mis-
leading. For example, in United States v. County of Fairfax, 5 0 the
court rejected the Attorney General's attempt to use applicant flow
statistics in a pattern or practice suit. The court agreed that use of
such statistics was a generally acceptable method, but stated that
it had a number of drawbacks:
First, it does not take into account whether an applicant is quali-
fied. Second, it is subject to manipulation by both employer and
employee, although there is no evidence of any manipulation in
this case. Third, if a particular employer has a reputation for
discrimination, this could reduce the number of minority or fem-
ale applicants. Fourth, it does not take into account applicant
training and preference. Fifth, it can penalize an employer who
has an aggressive affirmative action program which results in a
large number of minority or female applicants some of whom are
found not to be qualified. 5'
In County of Fairfax, the court rejected use of applicant flow statis-
147. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
148. 433 U.S. at 330.
149. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297 § 4D (1978).
150. 19 FEP Cas. 753 (E.D. Va. 1979).
151. Id. at 757.
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tics because they were available only for one year, 1978, during
which time the county had an aggressive affirmative action pro-
gram.
In Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 52 the Eighth Circuit criti-
cized the district court for relying too heavily on such statistics. At
issue in Donnell was whether GMC's educational requirements for
admission to its skilled trades apprentice program had a disparate
impact on blacks. The district court analyzed applicant data and
concluded that there was no such impact. The Eighth Circuit re-
versed, stating that:
The District Court failed to consider those applicants rejected for
failure to submit a [high school] transcript or for failure to file
more than a preliminary application. In this, the District Court
gave undue weight to potentially misleading applicant data since
the educational requirements will not only cause completed ap-
plications to be rejected, but it will also deter the completion of
applications.'5 '
The defendant argued that, because two-thirds of those in its ap-
prenticeship programs were drawn from its current employees, the
plaintiff was required to show the educational background of GMC
employees in addition to general SMSA statistics. The Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected this contention because GMC had exclusive control of
this information and had refused to give it to the plaintiffs, appar-
ently on the ground of burdensomeness. 54 Thus, in Donnell, general
population statistics were found better evidence than applicant flow
statistics or internal comparisons, both on the grounds of accuracy
and ease of access.
Notwithstanding the recognized weaknesses of applicant flow sta-
tistics, the courts generally prefer such statistics over general popu-
lation figures. In Hill v. Western Electric Co., 5' for example, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
acknowledged the imperfections of applicant flow statistics in foot-
note:
[T]he "applicant flow" theory has its imperfections. It penalizes
an employer's successful affirmative action efforts. Moreover, it
152. 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978).
153. Id. at 1298.
154. Id. at 1297.
155. 12 FEP Cas. 1175 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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theoretically is subject to manipulation. It also would the-
oretically penalize blacks or females who, because an employer
has a reputation for not employing blacks or females, would be
discouraged from applying for employment.' 6
Nevertheless, on the facts before it, the court found applicant flow
statistics to be "the appropriate and preferable measure"' 57 for de-
termining whether the employer's practices had a discriminatory
effect. The court's preference was based not so much on the strength
of applicant flow statistics as on the weakness of general population
statistics in this case. First, the court found that the Washington,
D C SMSA was too large an area to be considered as the area from
which the Arlington County, Virginia defendant drew its labor pool.
Thus, general population statistics based on the SMSA did not
provide accurate information as to persons who actually were avail-
able for work with the employer.'5 8 Secondly, the court criticized
general population statistics for failing to consider existing discrimi-
nation.' 59
In some cases, courts have found that general population data
simply are not probative. In Robinson v. City of Dallas, "" for exam-
ple, the plaintiff challenged the City of Dallas' policy of firing city
employees who did not pay their "just debts" as being discrimina-
tory against blacks. The plaintiff argued that the poor were less apt
to pay their debts than others and that blacks made up a dispropor-
tionate percentage of the city's poor. The Fifth Circuit found this
theory unpersuasive. It questioned the plaintiff's unsubstantiated
notion that the poor are less apt to pay their just debts than oth-
ers.'6 ' More importantly, the court held that the plaintiff's general
population statistics were irrelevant to his claim.
If the city of Dallas refused to hire any individual who had ever
failed to pay a just debt, statistics concerning the population as
a whole would be relevant. But in the present case the employ-
ment practice is applied only to employees of the city of Dallas.
Thus the question is whether black employees of the city of Dal-
las fail to pay their just debts more frequently than white
156. Id. at 1179 n.4.
157. Id. at 1179.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975).
161. Id. at 1273.
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employees of the city of Dallas. The statistics offered by plaintiff
are not helpful in answering this question.'62
Thus, in Robinson, the court held that the plaintiff could not prove
his case without internal data.
Similarly, in Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 6 3 the plain-
tiff challenged United State Steel's ("USS") promotion practices
for foremen. The plaintiff attempted to show discrimination by
comparing the number of black foremen employed by the defendant
with the number of blacks in the defendant's workforce. USS
argued, not very plausibly, that Hazelwood banned the use of this
type of internal data comparison.'64 The court rejected this interpre-
tation of Hazelwood and noted that general population statistics
would be an invalid measure in this case because "foremen are
rarely hired off the street."'65 Comparing the percentage of black
foremen on the defendant's workforce to the number of black man-
agers in the SMSA, therefore would "not reflect the available pool
for managers." 66 Thus, in Dickerson, as in Robinson, the court
found that general population statistics left unanswered whether
the defendant's particular employment practices had a discrimina-
tory effect.
In Dickerson, the plaintiff used another type of internal datum to
show that the defendant had engaged in discriminatory placement
of blacks. This was a Matched Pair Study of black and white work-
ers that showed a consistent historical placement of blacks in five
undesirable types of jobs.'6 7 In this study, white workers were
matched with black workers hired at about the same time to control
for differences in lengths of service. Although the defendant chal-
lenged the accuracy of this matching, the court was persuaded that
it was accurate. 68
In Smith v. Union Oil Co., the court rejected a defendant's at-
tempted use of applicant hire statistics. The defendant argued that
162. Id. at 1273-74.
163. 439 F Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.
1978).
164. 439 F Supp. at 81.
165. Id. at 82.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 77.
168. Id. at 78. In Pressetsen, the court suggested that a similar study might have been an
effective way to eliminate the bias in the plaintiffs' promotional study. 442 F Supp. at 613.
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its hiring practices did not have a disparate impact on blacks be-
cause it hired the same percentage of blacks as applied to it for
employment. The court rejected this argument on the ground that
the appropriate comparison was the percentage of black applicants
hired compared to the percentage of whites who were hired.'
Bare Statistical Proof
The Supreme Court has held that gross statistical disparities may
be sufficient in and of themselves to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. 7 ' The Court, however, has not defined how large the
disparity must be before it alone will establish a prima facie case.
The leading cases of Teamsters v. United States 7' and Hazelwood
School District v. United States'72 are similar in several respects.
Neither Teamsters nor Hazelwood turned on bare statistical proof.
Both were pattern and practice suits in which the Government al-
leged intentional discrimination. In each case, the Government bol-
stered its statistical case with individual testimony of specific in-
stances of discrimination. Nevertheless, the defendant company in
Teamsters argued that statistics alone could not prove conclusively
a pattern or practice of discrimination or even shift the burden of
169. 17 FEP Cas. at 975. Three protected classes were involved in Smith; blacks, Spanish-
surnamed Americans, and Asians. Through use of a hypothetical, the court showed that the
defendant's applicant-hire ratios were not necessarily probative of lack of discrimination. The
court's hypothetical was as follows:
APPLICATIONS
Total Applicants 200
Whites 40 (20%)
Blacks 20 (10%)
Asians 20 (10%)
Spanish surnameds 120 (60%)
APPLICANTS HIRED 50
Whites 40 (80%)
Blacks 5 (10%)
Asians 5 (10%)
Spanish-surnameds 0 ( 0%)
170. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977);
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
171. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
172. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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proof to the employer.173 In an ambiguous opinion by Justice Stew-
art, the Court affirmed the importance of statistics and apparently
indicated that statistics could establish a prima facie case. The
Court stated that "[w]e have repeatedly approved the use of sta-
tistical proof, where it reached proportions comparable to those
in this case, to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
in jury selection cases. ,174 The statistical disparities in
Teamsters were large. The proof in Teamsters showed a virtual
exclusion of blacks from the ranks of truck line drivers.' 75 Thus,
Teamsters suggests that huge statistical disparities can establish
prima facie cases of discrimination. The Court indicated that it
shares the general judicial preference for proof that is not exclu-
sively numerical by stating that "[t]he individuals who testified
about their ,personal experiences brought the cold numbers con-
vincingly to life. 1' 78
In Hazelwood, Justice Stewart confirmed the message of
Teamsters, stating that "[w]here gross statistical disparities can
be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie
proof of a pattern of [sic] practice of discrimination."'77 In Hazel-
wood, as in Teamsters, the Government had adduced evidence
of individual instances of discrimination. For the Court to decide
whether the plaintiff's statistical showing was gross enough to
establish a prima facie case therefore was unnecessary Never-
theless, the Court characterized that showing to be substantial
on its face.'78 In Hazelwood, the defendant employed 1.4% and
1.8% black teachers in the 1972-73 and 1973-74 school years,
respectively It argued that the relevant labor market was 5.7%
black. The Government argued that the relevant market was
15.4% black.' 9 The Court found that the disparity was significant
173. 431 U.S. at 339.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Before 1969, the defendant had employed only one black as a line driver. At the time
of trial, 5% of the defendant's workforce was black, but only 0.4% of its line drivers were
black. All of the black line drivers had been hired after commencement of the litigation. 431
U.S. at 337. Two of the three jury selection cases cited by the Court, Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935), and Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), showed complete exclusion
of blacks or Hispanics from jury duty. In Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), the county
was 60% black, but only 37% of the persons on the grand jury list were black. Moreover, of
178 persons excluded from the list of lack of intelligence or "uprightness," 171 were black.
Id. at 358.
176. 431 U.S. at 339.
177. 433 U.S. at 307-08.
178. Id. at 309.
179. Id. at 308.10.
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under either theory Basing its finding of substantiality on a
standard deviation analysis of the figures, the Court stated that
calculation of standard deviations is "[a] precise method of mea-
suring the significance of such statistical disparities.'' 8
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,'8' a disparate impact case, the Court
again discussed the role of statistics in an opinion by Justice Stew-
art. The Court stated that "to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral
standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly
discriminatory pattern.' '8 2 The Court found that the plaintiff's evi-
dence, which was entirely statistical in nature, showed that the
height-weight requirements of the Alabama Board of Corrections
had a discriminatory effect on women. The plaintiff showed that
these requirements operated to exclude 41.13% of the female popu-
lation, but less than 1% of the male population,'8 but did not bolster
this statistical showing with evidence of past discriminatory prac-
tices, subjective hiring practices, or any of the other types of evi-
dence that often accompany statistical proof. The defendant at-
tacked the plaintiffs evidence on the ground that she had used the
wrong statistics; she had used a general population comparison
rather than applicant flow statistics. The Court rejected this attack
on the sufficiency of the evidence:
The plaintiffs in a case such as this are not required to exhaust
every possible source of evidence, if the evidence actually pre-
sented on its face conspicuously demonstrates a job require-
ment's grossly discriminatory impact. If the employer discerns
180. Id. at 308 n.14. The Court explained the application of this type of analysis as follows:
'"[als a general rule for such large samples, if the difference between the expected value and
the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations,' then the hypothesis
that teachers were hired without regard to race would be suspect." 433 U.S. at 308 n.14,
quoting Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 (1977). In Hazelwood, even using the defen-
dant's market figure, the 4% deviation between the percentage of black teachers employed
by the defendant and the percentage on the market gave rise to a difference of more than six
standard deviations in 1972-73. Id.
The new Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures set up a four-fifths rule to
determine whether a statistical showing amounts to a showing of adverse impact. Under this
rule, adverse impact has been shown where the selection rate for the plaintiff's class is less
than four-fifths or 80% of the selection rate for the most successful group of applicants. 43
Fed. Reg. 38,297 (1978).
181. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
182. Id. at 329.
183. Id. at 329-30.
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fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff, he is
free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own. In this case no
such effort was made. 184
Thus, in Dothard, statistical proof became conclusive proof of dis-
crimination when the employer failed to convince the Court that the
requirements that had a disparate impact were job-related.
Although Teamsters, Hazelwood, and Dothard have clarified the
role of statistics, they have left many questions unanswered. The
Court deliberately has refrained from articulating inflexible rules as
to appropriate types of statistical proof. In Teamsters, the Court
cautioned that "statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted.
In short, their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances."18
Although the lower courts are in substantial agreement that sta-
tistical proof alone may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, 8' they have recognized and seem increasingly
concerned that incomplete statistical comparisons, comparisons
that do not take into account all relevant factors, can be seriously
misleading. Consequently, the courts have demanded increasingly
sophisticated evidentiary showings as part of the plaintiff's prima
facie case. The courts' growing sophistication is particularly appar-
ent in cases involving claimed discrimination at the white collar and
professional levels.
The pre-Hazelwood cases on statistical disparities predictably
reveal less sophisticated statistical analyses than the post-
Hazelwood cases. Untted States v. Hayes Internattonal Corp. 87 is an
example. In Hayes, the court found the following evidence sufficient
to establish a prima facie case:
[A]t the time the suit was brought Hayes employed 918 whites
and 6 negroes in office and technical positions. Between that time
and October, 1969 an additional 258 whites and 14 negroes were
hired in office and technical jobs. Population figures reveal that
Birmingham is composed of roughly 30% negroes. l"
184. Id. at 331.
185. 431 U.S. at 340.
186. See, e.g., Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978);
Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
187. 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972).
188. Id. at 120.
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The court found these "lopsided ratios" sufficient to shift the bur-
den of proof despite an absence of evidence as to the percentage of
Birmingham blacks qualified for office and technical jobs."8'
The Ninth Circuit was somewhat more cautious in Kaplan v.
Internatinal Alliance."' The court held that a female still photog-
rapher had established a prima facie case of discrimination by a
union when she showed that the union roster included no females.
The court, however, required some evidence that qualified female
still photographers were available, but did not specify what type of
showing had been made of the availability of female still photogra-
phers.' 1
The Fourth Circuit recognized before Hazelwood that isolated
statistical showings could be misleading. In Roman v. ESB, Inc., "I
the plaintiffs alleged discrimination by the defendant in hiring, lay-
offs, discharges, pay, promotion, and other employment practices.
One issue concerned the company's layoff in 1978. Prior to the lay-
off, 54% of the company's workforce was non-white. Sixty-three
percent of the laid-off workers were non-white. After the layoff, 53%
of the hourly workforce was non-white. The plaintiffs attempted to
show that recalls after the layoff had been discriminatory by focus-
ing on the three-month period immediately after the layoff when 28
employees were hired, only one of whom was black. The court, how-
189. Similarly, in Senter v. General Motors Corp., the court held that the plaintiffs had
made out a prima facie case of promotional discrimination by showing that there were few
black supervisors compared to the percentage of black hourly workers. This evidence was held
to be part of a conclusive showing of discrimination. 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 870 (1976).
190. 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975).
191. In requiring evidence that qualified female still photographers were available, the
court observed:
Upon showing wholly disproportionate female membership in a union in com-
parison to the available female work force in a demographic area, an inference
arises that the sex imbalance results from discrimination, and the burden of
going forward and the burden of persuasion is shifted to the accused, for such a
showing is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Local
659 notes that the absence of variables properly correlating the statistics could
undermine the reasonableness of the inference drawn therefrom. However, there
was evidence indicating that qualified female still photographers were available
in the Los Angeles area, and no individual on the 60 member roster was a female
movie still photographer. The basing of its finding of discrimination in part on
these statistics was not clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1358 (footnotes omitted).
192. 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976).
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ever, found that this evidence either was insufficient to establish a
prima facie or had been rebutted.1 3 The court cautioned that
"isolated bits of statistical information [do not] necessarily make
a prima facie case when divorced from other and contrary statistics
and from the statistical picture of all the employment at the
plant."'94 In finding that a prima facie case had not been made, the
court considered the following facts: (a) the layoffs had been made
under a bona fide seniority system; (b) the defendant had a non-
white employee percentage that exceeded the percentage of the non-
white population in the surrounding community; and (c) when hir-
ing both before and after the three month period challenged by the
plaintiffs was examined, there was no disparate impact on blacks."'
The court also was influenced by the lack of evidence showing that
qualified blacks were denied promotion or placement."'
Since Hazeiwood, the courts more frequently have insisted on
rigorous showings of the relevant comparative market, especially
when discrimination is claimed to exist at higher levels of employ-
ment. In EEOC v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,"' the Govern-
ment argued that its statistics showing a higher percentage of blacks
than whites assigned to lower level jobs established a prima facie
case of placement discrimination. The court, however, disagreed on
the rationale that without more, such statistics do not establish a
disparate impact; if, for example, the percentage of blacks in higher
skilled jobs reflected the percentage of qualified blacks in the labor
force, then "the more reasonable inference would be that substan-
tially more blacks than whites were willing to take the service
worker jobs.""'
The court in du Pont also recognized that the statistical dispari-
ties may be indicative of pre-Title VII practices rather than actiona-
ble discrimination. Du Pont had begun the post-Title VII period
with a highly segregated work force. The court recognized that pres-
ent showings of statistical disparities might reflect this pre-Act dis-
193. Id. at 1351.
194. Id. at 1352-53. The court also noted that "the absence of other evidence of discrimina-
tion should be considered in determining whether a prima facie case is made, just as the
presence of other evidence of discrimination should be considered in arriving at the same
conclusion." Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1353.
197. 445 F Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1978).
198. Id. at 240 (citation omitted).
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
crimination rather than actionable post-Act practices' and found
that this phenomenon of "lag time" was particularly relevant to
evaluation of data on promotions above the "career" level:
Candidates for above career level and supervisory positions come
largely from the ranks of those having substantial experience in
career level jobs. Accordingly, it is to be expected that racially
neutral promotion procedures would not significantly increase
black representation in these higher positions until sometime
after significant black participation at the career job level is
reached. 00
Du Pont thus held that statistically significant disparities are not
probative of discrimination unless they are placed in the context of
showing that members of the protected class in fact are available
and qualified for the positions from which they allegedly are ex-
cluded.20
In Pack v. ERDA,°0 an individual plaintiff claimed that she was
denied promotional opportunities by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion because of her sex and attempted to establish a prima facie case
with statistics showing that women were underrepresented in upper
civil service grades. The Ninth Circuit, however, was unimpressed;
because the plaintiff failed to show the relevant labor market, the
court refused to infer that ERDA was discriminating against
females..20
199. Id. at 234.
200. Id. at 235.
201. Cf. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 15 FEP Cas. 144 (N.D. Ala. 1977), in which the court
recognized the phenomenon of lag time, but described it as an element in rebutting a prima
facie showing:
[T]he law recognizes the reality of the situation; namely, that departments are
not reshuffled anew each year but are, rather, the result of past assignments as
well as new ones. Hence, as noted in Teamsters, [sic] an employer can over-
come the prima facie effect of such statistics by showing that 'the claimed
discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act [assignments] rather than un-
lawful post-Act discrimination.'
Id. at 147-48 (footnote omitted).
202. 566 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1977).
203. The court observed that, although "98% of the employees at grades GS-11 and above
were males, whereas 95% of the lower-grade professionals were female [nlo evidence
whatsoever was introduced to demonstrate that the lower-grade professional women were
qualified to occupy the higher positions or that there elsewhere existed a pool of qualified
women applicants." Id. at 1113.
Similarly, in EEOC v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., the Fourth Circuit held that "[in the
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In Lee v. City of Richmond,24 the district court held that a prima
facie case of hiring and promotional discrimination could be estab-
lished only by showing that equally qualified persons were treated
differently on the basis of race:
Since the plaintiffs produced no information on the number of
blacks available m Richmond with the requisite skills for the
higher paying jobs or who had actually applied for the higher
paying jobs, it is difficult to understand how plaintiffs' expert
arrived at what the expected black representations in those
higher paying jobs should be. Likewise, a discrepancy between
black and white average advancement in grade is not significant
unless it reflects the fact that the blacks in the same position as
whites and with the same qualifications have been passed over
in favor of whites.2 1
Finally, the court held that a showing that few blacks held jobs in
the higher pay grades proved nothing in the absence of some show-
ing of the number of blacks in the Richmond job market with the
requisite job skills.28
The courts have been unreceptive to efforts to establish prima
facie cases on the bare comparison of the defendant's workforce to
the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. In McAdory v. Scien-
tific Research Instruments, Inc.,217 the plaintiff claimed that she had
not been hired because of her race and introduced evidence showing
that the defendant employed a lesser percentage of blacks than the
Baltimore SMSA. The court field this to be insufficient to establish
a prima facie case because:
plaintiff makes no effort to show the percentage of black electrical
engineers, black Ph.D.'s, black draftsmen, black electrical tech-
nicians or black secretaries in Baltimore, or to show the number
of blacks that have applied with the defendant and have been
rejected in each job classification. At this juncture it is not neces-
sary to determine the quantum of statistical evidence necessary
to successfully shift the burden, for it is sufficient to hold that
absence of data concerning the number of qualified black persons in the labor pool, the
commission's evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
against black employees as a class." 577 F.2d 229, .233 (4th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
204. 456 F Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1978).
205. Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 770.
207. 355 F Supp. 468 (D. Md. 1973).
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mere citation of a general population figure without adequate
correlation will not suffice.2 11
The courts also have rejected statistical showings as support for
a prima facie case even when some effort has been made to show
the relevant labor market. In Opara v Modern Manufacturers,
Co.,20° an individual plaintiff claimed that the defendant's refusal
to transfer her from her position as a tableworker to one as a sewer
was discriminatory She claimed that sewers made more money
than tableworkers and that the company was confining blacks to the
lower paying positions. Statistical evidence was introduced showing
that the company employed fewer black sewers than were available
in the relevant labor market. The United States District Court for
the District of Maryland found this evidence insufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case because no evidence was introduced that
other employees, black or white, were transferred from one job to
another. 20
In EEOC v. Union Planters National Bank,2" the United States
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee rejected the
EEOC's effort to show hiring, promotion, and wage discrimination
by a bank against blacks and females. The agency attempted to
establish a prima facie case through workforce comparisons. When
the agency produced actual persons who claimed discrimination,
the court was willing to give weight to rather sketchy statistical
showings. For example, two blacks claimed they had been discrimi-
natorily denied employment as management trainees. The court
found their claim and a weak statistical showing "barely sufficient"
208. Id. at 475. Accord, In re National Airlines, 434 F Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Louis
v. Pennsylvania Indus. Dev. Auth., 371 F Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
209. 434 F Supp. 1040 (D. Md. 1977).
210. Id. at 1044. The court concluded:
Although the court is aware from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff that
there is a higher percentage of blacks hired as tableworkers than hired as sewers
and that a greater percentage of black sewers live in the community than were
employed at Modem, the court cannot conclude from this statistic that this
disparity is due to racial discrimination. The statistics do not indicate to
this court that Modem systematically excluded blacks from its sewer positions.
In fact, numerically there are more black sewers than black tableworkers. There
was no evidence introduced at trial to indicate that sewer positions were re-
served for white employees and that blacks who applied for positions as a sewer
were turned down for that position and were hired only as tableworkers.
Id. at 1046 (citation omitted).
211. No. 73-132 (W.D. Tenn. May 30, 1979).
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to establish a prima facie case with regard to this claim. " ' The
court, however, was unpersuaded that the EEOC had made out a
prima facie case with its statistical evidence on hiring and promo-
tion. It commented that, without evidence as to the availability of
qualified applicants, proof that a certain percentage of blacks or
females were hired or promoted provided no valid basis for statisti-
cal comparison.213 The court also found that the agency's failure to
interpret properly information from the bank's computerized per-
sonnel system rendered its studies non-probative.
The EEOC offered a Dr. Henderson as an expert witness on hir-
ing. The court found his testimony utterly unpersuasive in part
because he
made no analysis of the job openings, grades or descriptions at
Union Planters, the skills required for employment, the relation-
ship of jobs to salary grade or the availability of blacks and fe-
males with requisite skills for employment. Furthermore, while
Dr. Henderson attempted to analyze hiring into initial salary
grade, he was unable to utilize the term "initial salary grade" as
used on the computer printout.211
The court likewise found that Dr. Henderson's analysis of job place-
ment was unpersuasive because it was based insufficiently upon
"accurate information or demonstrably sound statistical methods
under the circumstances stated. 215 Similarly, with regard to the
claim of sex discrimination in higher job grades, the court deter-
mined that the statistical evidence did not show satisfactorily the
number of qualified persons who sought new positions or promo-
tions, the ratio or rejections by race or sex, or the particular persons
who claimed such discrimination. Thus "it could . as easily
[have been] presumed that ther [sic] were more whites and males
with college degrees (and/or graduate) and/or with college experi-
ence seeking employment and advancement than there were compa-
rable blacks or females at Union Planters Bank. 21 Finally, the
212. Id., slip op. at 7.
213. Id., slip op. at 9.
214. Id., slip op. at 12.
215. Id., slip op. at 12-13. Dr. Henderson compared black males with hlgh school education
or less to white males with a high school education or less over a three year period, even
though "three times as many black males gave no education information as did those black
or white males which indicated they were high school graduates." Id.
216. Id., slip op. at 14.
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court found the plaintiff's showing that white males on the average
earned more than blacks or females to support an inference of dis-
crimmation.1 7 Unon Planters supports the conclusion that statisti-
cal showings do not establish prima facie cases unless they are com-
plete enough to indicate that qualified members of protected classes
have been denied employment or treated differently on the basis of
race or sex than persons with the same qualifications.
Like the Supreme Court, the lower courts have expressed a de-
cided preference for statistical proof that is bolstered by other types
of evidence. Indeed, before 1977, the Fourth Circuit had insisted on
such bolstering. In Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 218 the Fourth
Circuit held that statistics showing a small number of black em-
ployees on the defendant's workforce relative to the percentage of
blacks in the community were insufficient to establish a prima facie
case. The court held that the plaintiff needed to produce evidence
"that would identify any Negro who had been specifically denied
employment because of his or her race or color." ' The court ac-
knowledged the value of statistics, but cautioned that "statistics
must not be accepted uncritically, without careful consideration of
all relevant factors. Especially where such statistics are 'based on
community racial proportions,' which is the situation in this case,
they are 'ambiguous' and 'ought to be listened to with a critical
ear.' ,,0 This cautious approach to statistics taken in Logan is still
reflected in judicial evaluation of statistical proof.
In Scott v. Unwersity of Delaware,2 ' for example, the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware was influenced by
the plaintiff's failure to produce individual testimony of discrimina-
tion. The court stated that "[w]hile I realize that a plaintiff in a
disparate impact case is entitled to rely solely on statistics, the
absence of any identified victim ig nevertheless significant. 221 2 Al-
though the plaintiff's evidence did show underutilization of blacks
on the University of Delaware faculty, the court concluded that the
217. Id., slip op. at 17.
218. 521 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1971).
219. Id. at 883.
220. Id., citing Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 H-Rv. L. REv. 1109, 1154 (1971).
221. 455 F Supp. 1102 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, No.
78-2365 (3d Cir. June 6, 1979).
222. 455 F Supp. at 1130.
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cause for this underutilization was a black preference for other insti-
tutions rather than discriminatory hiring practices by the Univer-
slty 2
Once the burden of proof has shifted to the defendant, the risk of
non-persuasion remains. Perhaps as a result of this, the courts ap-
pear to be in general agreement that statistical proof alone cannot
conclusively establish discrimination. 22 The Supreme Court sug-
gested this in Teamsters when it cautioned that "statistics are not
irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of
evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."22
Scott v. Unversity of Delaware2 1 contains the most explicit rec-
ognition that a statistical disparity may show that something in a
hiring process is race-related without necessarily showing that the
"something" is discrimination. The plaintiff in Scott showed that
only 1.46% of the University's faculty was black but that the avail-
able pool of black faculty was 2.55%. Thus, the observed value of
black faculty was 1.97% standard deviations below the expected
value. Although the court found this level of disparity sufficient to
establish a prima facie case,22 in view of all of the evidence, it held
that a conclusive showing of discrimination had not been made.228
223. Id.
224. The Eighth Circuit has stated that statistical proof can be conclusive evidence in class
actions. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Reed v. Arlington
Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973). In both of these cases, however, the plaintiffs had
produced evidence other than statistics.
225. 431 U.S. at 340 (footnote omitted). At least one Justice has concluded that bare
statistical proof cannot be conclusive. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979),
Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion that: "[Wihile under Title VII, a mere
disparity may provide the basis for a prima facie case against an employer, it would not
conclusively prove a violation of the Act." Id. at 2733 (citations omitted). The case law in
the lower federal courts generally supports Justice Blackmun's statement.
226. 455 F Supp. 1102 (D. Del. 1978).
227. Id. at 1127. Cf. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d
1368, 1379 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 132 (1978) (suggesting a floor of two standard
deviations as the test for statistical significance in discrimination cases).
228. In support of this determination, the court noted:
In summary, the limited applicant flow data and hiring flow data available
do not support the inference of disparate impact on blacks. On the other hand,
the static work force data cited by Dr. Siskin and the applicant supplemental
form data do provide some support for Dr. Siskin's opinion that "there is some-
thing in the process of selecting new full time faculty which relates to race."
Even if this hypothesis be accepted, however, one must further ask what it is in
the process which is related to race. There are three possibilities. First, it could
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The employer was able to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion by producing evidence of its efforts to recruit black faculty
members.229
In Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 230 the plaintiffs made out a prima
facie case of discriminatory job assignments by comparing the racial
composition of various departments with each other and with gen-
eral census figures. The company, however, was able to rebut the
prima facie case by showing that the racial composition of its de-
partments resulted from pre-Act practices:
[A]n employer can overcome the prima facie effect of such sta-
tistics by showing that "the claimed discriminatory pattern is a
product of pre-Act [assignments] rather than unlawful post-Act
discrimination." Here, the evidence shows that the somewhat
disparate composition of the departments in the post-1966 period
were attributable to the assignments made prior to Title VII
Indeed, these very exhibits reflect that the extent of de-
partmental variations from the overall work force composition
was being reduced each succeeding year during the critical time
period.2i
The company rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie showing by intro-
ducing statistics regarding its post-Act practices and evidence of its
efforts to integrate its department.
Judging Employment Practices: Component-by-Component v. Bot-
tom Line Effect Measurement
A split of authority exists among the courts as to whether the
be that the University's methods of recruitment, i.e., the dissemination of infor-
mation about faculty vacancies, result in a low level of black exposure. Second,
it could be that the decision-makers choose non-black candidates from the
applicant pool at a rate disproportionate to their numbers. Finally, it could be
that black academic candidates are able to choose among a number of employ-
ment opportunities and that a lower proportion of qualified blacks than quali-
fied whites views the University of Delaware as a desirable place to be a faculty
member. To the extent that a factor related to race does play a role in the
selection of full time faculty at the University, the most reasonable reconcilia-
tion of all of the evidence, statistical and non-statistical, is that the third by-
pothesis is the correct one.
455 F Supp. at 1128-29.
229. Cf. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendant unable
to rebut a prima facie case by parrying specific allegations of discrimination).
230. 15 FEP Cas. 144 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
231. Id. at 147-48 (citations omitted).
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effect of employment practices is to be measured by their bottom
line effect or on a component-by-component basis. In EEOC v. Na-
vajo Refining Co.,232 the Tenth Circuit held that the bottom line
approach is the correct one. The court reversed an injunction
against the use of a high school diploma requirement and a passing
grade on an employment test as employment prerequisites, and
observed that:
[t]here is disparity between SSA's [Spanish surnamed Ameri-
cans] and Anglos in these counties as to numbers who have a
high school education or the GED equivalent, and with respect
to the pass rate on the tests before the racial factor adjustment
is made. But we do not get to that point unless there is discrimi-
nation in fact in actual numbers hired.2"
The court held that Navajo was free to use its requirements pro-
vided that they did not result in a disparity in the actual numbers
hired.
The Sixth Circuit also has adopted a bottom line approach. In
Smith v. Troyan,2" the City of East Cleveland used an entrance
"examination" consisting of several steps to choose police officers.
Among these steps were the Army General Classification Test
("AGCT") and a statutory veterans preference. Whites passed the
AGCT at a significantly higher rate than blacks, but the veterans
preference favored blacks because of their disproportionately high
representation among veterans. In effect, these two requirements
cancelled each other so that the total hiring process did not favor
whites or blacks. The district court held that, regardless of the over-
all results of the hiring process, the disproportionately high black
failure rate on the AGCT established a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. The Sixth Circuit reversed. It characterized the AGCT
and the veterans preference as a "subtest" of the overall entrance
examination and held:
[t]hat blacks fare less well than whites on the AGCT, a
"subtest" in the process of hiring East Cleveland police officers,
232. 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979).
233. Id. at 991.
234. 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 426 U.S. 934, rehearing dented, 429 U.S.
933 (1976).
235. Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub noma., Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 933 (1976).
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is insufficient in itself to require defendants to justify the AGCT
as being job-related. Carried to its logical extreme, such a crite-
rion would require the elimination of individual questions
marked by poorer performance by a racial group, on the ground
that such a question was a "subtest" of the "subtest."'3
The Sixth and the Tenth Circuits are the only circuits that have
addressed squarely whether the bottom line approach is the correct
one. Their reasoning, however, is at odds with the approach taken
by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.
In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 3 the Fifth Circuit
rejected Goodyear's attempt to show that its transfer policies did
not have an adverse effect on blacks. The plaintiff showed that over
49% of blacks failed Goodyear's written tests which had been a
prerequisite to transfer out of the labor department until 1971,
whereas only 15% of whites failed the tests.2s Goodyear produced
statistics showing that it transferred black employees and hired
blacks from the Houston area in a ratio equivalent to the total black
population in that area. The court treated this proof as irrelevant
to its finding of discrimination because it showed only "that Good-
year has attempted by other practices to remove the taint of the
tests' consequences. The fact still remains that for those potential
black hirees and black labor department transferors, these unvali-
dated [sic] testing devices have a substantial invidious effect."' 9
Although the court did not explain fully the logic that led to its
holding, the result of Johnson seems to be that if a single element
of an employer's practices is discriminatory, the employer cannot
escape liability even if other elements of the practice have a coun-
terbalancing effect.
The Eighth Circuit implicitly has reached the same result. In
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,?A° the court held that the Pacific
Railroad's policy of not hiring any person convicted of a criminal
offense had a racially discriminatory effect and instructed the dis-
trict court to enjoin this practice. The court did not discuss the
overall effect of the railroad's hiring process. Chief Justice Gibson's
236. 520 F.2d at 498.
237. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
238. Id. at 1372.
239. Id. at 1373.
240. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
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separate opinion, however, indicates that 29% of the defendant's
employees apparently were black, even though blacks comprised
only 16.4% of the relevant labor market.24  Because the majority did
not find these statistics even worthy of discussion, the conclusion
can be drawn that, like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit adheres
to a component-by-component analysis.
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia has attacked directly the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Smith.
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa
Ana,242 involving police and firefighter employment, the defendants
argued that "if they [could] establish overall acceptance rates
which do not reveal a disproportionate impact on minority groups,
then a disproportionate impact on a particular test [would] not
constitute the kind of adverse impact necessary for a prima facie
case. ' 243 The court distinguished Smith on the ground that the writ-
ten tests used by the City of Santa Ana were not "subtests," but
rather "pass-fail hurdles;" applicants who failed these tests were
denied jobs without any opportunity to counteract their low scores
by achieving higher scores in other areas of the testing process.24
The court reasoned that a favorable overall acceptance rate does not
indicate a lack of discrimination; the Civil Rights Act protects
individuals, and the discriminatory impact on an individual is not
lessened merely because an employer has favorable minority accept-
ance rates.Ul Finally, the court attacked the "subtest" doctrine it-
self as being of "dubious utility-"
Of course, employers should not be compelled to justify each and
every question on a written test. But if a procedure forms a sub-
stantial part of an employee's [sic] selection process, and if that
procedure operates adversely against minority groups, employers
should not be relieved of the burden of defending that procedure
merely because it did not constitute the entirety of the hiring
process.26
The basis of the court's holding was that, whatever the overall effect
of an employer's practices, if individual components exclude mdi-
241. Id. at 1300.
242. 410 F Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
243. Id. at 894.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 895.
246. Id.
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vidual members of minority groups because of each individual's
minority status, an employer may be found to have discriminated.
Although the courts disagree on whether to take a bottom line
approach, that courts will not take this approach when plaintiffs
produce testimony of individuals who have been excluded by the
challenged element of the employment process probably should be
assumed. The new Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures2 4 represent a compromise among government agencies on
whether to use the bottom line or component-by-component ap-
proach. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Guidelines, the De-
partments of Labor and Justice and the Civil Service Commission
had adopted a bottom line approach, whereas the EEOC had in-
sisted that each component of an employment practice had to be
examined individually 245 The new Uniform Guidelines do not pur-
port to resolve the legal question of which approach is the correct
one. Rather, they adopt the bottom line approach as a matter of
administrative and prosecutorial discretion.249 Individual compo-
nents of the employment system usually will not have to be vali-
dated unless the overall result of the process is an adverse impact
on a protected group. The government agencies reserve the right to
intervene in some cases involving no overall adverse impact. The
Guidelines list two types of situations in which the Government may
intervene on the basis of a single component:
(1) where the selection procedure is a significant factor in the
continuation of patterns of assignments of incumbent employees
caused by prior discriminatory employment practices,
(2) where the weight of court decisions or administrative inter-
pretations hold that a specific procedure (such as height or weight
requirements or no-arrest records) is not job-related in the same
or similar circumstances.2'
The regulations indicate that this is not meant to be an exhaustive
list of the types of situations in which the Government will intervene
in the absence of an overall adverse impact. The examples, however,
247. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978).
248. Compare 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.2-1607.3 (1977) (EEOC guidelines) with 41 C.F.R. § 60-
3.4(b) (1976) (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures). Under the FCCP guidelines, subparts of the selection procedure are
to be examined only if the entire process has an adverse impact.
249. 43 Fed. Reg. at 38,297.
250. Id.
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indicate that the Government rarely will intervene in situations
involving no overall adverse impact. Intervention probably should
not be expected unless some factor such as prior discrimination or
a clearly illegal practice makes the use of a single component partic-
ularly egregious even in the absence of overall adverse impact.
Non-Statistical Factors Relevant to a Prima Facie Showing of
Discrimination
Because the courts seldom find statistical evidence, except when
it indicates a gross disparity, to be sufficient to establish a prima
facie case, plaintiffs seldom rely solely on statistical evidence.
Rather, they bring their statistical evidence to life with individual
testimony, with showings that the employer's practices are apt to
serve as a ready mechanism of discrimination, or with showings that
the employer has engaged in discrimination in the past. Each type
of evidence bolsters the inference of discrimination that is drawn
from the plaintiff's statistical showing.
1. Individual Testimony
Individual testimony can be the strohgest additional proof. In
Pressetsen,25' the court discussed the relation of individual evidence
to statistical proof in a class action. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff's individual testimony was deficient because it did not con-
form to the McDonnell Douglas formula for establishing a prima
facie case. 2 ' The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
it declined to read McDonnell Douglas as establishing an inflexible
rule of proof. Second, the court held that the strength of individual
testimony could vary widely according to the strength of the statisti-
cal showing. The court in Presseisen thus determined that when the
statistical evidence is strong enough to create a prima facie case of
discrimination, individuals need only testify that they were denied
employment or promotion and the court will infer discrimination.
251. 442 F Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
252. In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing: 1) that he belongs to a protected class; 2) that
he was qualified and applied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) that
he was rejected despite his qualifications; and 4) the position remained open after his rejec-
tion and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of the complainant's
qualifications. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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When the statistical evidence is weaker, however, the burden on the
individual class members is much the same as under McDonnell
Douglas and will differ according to the content of their testimony 213
In Wade v. Mississippi Cooperatwe Extensin Service,254 individ-
ual testimony served not so much to bolster the inferences drawn
from the statistical evidence as to quiet the court's doubts about the
propriety of the plaintiff's statistical methodology The plaintiff
sought to prove, primarily by the method of multi-variate regression
analysis, =5 that the defendant's evaluation procedure resulted in
lower average salaries for blacks. The defendant argued that regres-
sion analysis was "inappropriate for use in a social service set-
ting."' 5 The Fifth Circuit focused on the individual testimony as a
way to avoid determining the probativeness of the statistical analy-
sis:
Although multi-variate regression analysis is indeed a sophisti-
cated and difficult method of proof in an employment discrimina-
tion case, there was additional evidence of specific instances of
black and white workers with essentially similar experience and
qualifications receiving disparate salaries. Thus, we find that
while in some instances the statistical facts spoke for themselves,
as in the absence of promotions of black professional workers, in
other cases, there was evidence beyond the statistical facts and
253.
Thus, if a female faculty member were to testify that she overheard a conversa-
tion between the President and the Provost wherein the President of the College
told the Provost to make sure that no women are promoted above the rank of
Assistant Professor, then such testimony obviously would not have to meet a
McDonnell-Douglas type formula. However, if a female faculty member were to
testify, as many did in this case, that, by reason of their own personal experience
at Swarthmore, they were victims of alleged discrimination, then they would
have to show more than the mere fact that they were not hired, promoted,
renewed, tenured, etc. They must also demonstrate that the alleged discrimina-
tion did not result from the most common legitimate non-sexist reason on which
Swarthmore might deny a female faculty member a promotion, renewal and
tenure-an absolute or relative lack of qualification-and in the case of hiring,
an absence of a vacancy.
442 F Supp. 593, 601 (citation omitted).
254. 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
255. Multi-variate regression analysis is a complex statistical method in which information
from different tests or evaluation procedures is combined to yield one overall score. This score
is intended to predict an individual's ability or achievement potential in a given area or
occupation. A. ANASTAsi, supra note 70, at 180-81.
256. 528 F.2d at 517.
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analysis that would support an inference of discrimination as in
the case of salaries.2 7
In Presseisen, the court viewed individual testimony as a way for
plaintiffs to bolster the inferences drawn from their statistical show-
ing. In Wade, evidence that worked independently of the statistical
showing enabled the court to infer discrimination without relying on
a form of statistical analysis with which it was uncomfortable.
.2. Potentially Discriminatory Employment Practices
The courts have recognized since Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,
that, although certain types of employment practices are not per se
violations of equal opportunity law, they can serve as "ready
mechanism[s] for discrimination. '"25 The type of practices con-
demned in Rowe were invalid because they vested uncontrolled dis-
cretion in supervisory personnel. A showing that an employer's per-
sonnel practices leave such uncontrolled discretion in supervisors
can bolster a statistical showing by making it much more difficult
for an employer to convince the court that any statistical disparity
is not the result of discrimination. In United States v. N.L. Indus-
tries, Inc., 29 the plaintiff showed that only three of the defendant's
one hundred foremen were black. The Fifth Circuit held that these
numbers gave rise to a strong inference of discrimination. This infer-
ence became conclusive when the plaintiff also showed that foremen
were chosen on the basis of subjective recommendations by incum-
bent foremen"' and that the defendant had a history of discrimina-
tion. In Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,2' the plain-
tiff bolstered a strong statistical showing of discrimination in several
ways. The court found the statistical showing to be strong enough
that it could have established a prima facie case by itself. The
plaintiff produced other evidence as well, however, leading the court
to state that:
[w]e conclude that the plaintiff's evidence of racial disparities
in promotions to foreman [sic] after 1965, the exclusion of blacks
from such positions prior to 1965, subjectively based promotion
257. Id. (footnote omitted).
258. 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972).
259. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
260. Id. at 368.
261. 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978).
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decisions by white supervisors after 1965, and the testimony by
individual class members of discrimination they suffered, make
a prima facie case of [discrimination]. 26
In these Fifth Circuit opinions, subjective employment practices
constituted an additional element that reinforced the statistical
showing.
In Smith v. Union Oil Co.,"63 the court treated statistical evidence
as bolstering a showing of discrimination made by demonstrating
the defendant's subjective employment practices. The court recog-
nized that subjective employment practices violate the law only if
they are shown to have a discriminatory effect. Nevertheless, the
court expected to find such an effect and viewed statistics as a way
to confirm rather than to trigger its suspicions. 211 Smith indicates
the judicial hostility toward employment practices that vest a great
deal of discretion in evaluators. The plaintiff's showing that Union
Oil used highly subjective employment practices prepared the court
to draw an inference of discrimination from the statistical showing.
In Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 2 5 the Fourth
Circuit held that the defendant could not refute the inference of
discrimination drawn from the plaintiff's statistics because it had
no objective standards for placement and promotion. The plaintiff's
statistics showed that blacks were largely relegated to lower paying
jobs. The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that discrimination had
been conclusively shown.266 The court in Brown apparently fore-
closed the notion that in this instance the defendant could have
shown non-discriminatory subjective practices. The combined ef-
fect of the plaintiffs statistical showing and the defendant's subjec-
tive practices thus was to create an irrefutable case of discrimina-
tion.
Similarly, in Leisner v. New York Telephone Co., 267 the district
court issued a preliminary injunction against the defendant's alleg-
edly discriminatory hiring and promotion policies because it
doubted that the defendant would be able to rebut the inference
drawn from the plaintiffs' statistical evidence at trial. In Leisner,
262. Id. at 1387.
263. 17 FEP Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
264. Id. at 983.
265. 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972).
266. Id. at 1382-83.
267. 358 F Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the plaintiffs supported an allegation of sex discrimination in hiring
and promoting women into management level positions with a
showing that women were concentrated at lower level management
positions. The court concluded that the defendant probably would
have been unable to rebut the inference of discrimination because
its hiring criteria had not been validated and, more significantly,
because its supervisors had wide discretion in applying the hiring
criteria.26
3. History of Past Discrimination
Evidence that a defendant has engaged in discrimination in the
past bolsters a statistical showing by giving the courts a context in
which to interpret the plaintiff's statistics. In Hazelwood, the Court
affirmed the use of evidence of past discrimination as an interpreta-
tive aid: "Proof that an 6mployer engaged in racial discrimination
prior to the effective date of Title VII might in some circumstances
support the inference that such discrimination continued, particu-
larly where relevant aspects of the decisionmaking process had un-
dergone little change. '269
In both Parson and N.L. Industries, the Fifth Circuit used evi-
dence of past discrimination in the manner suggested by the Court.
In N.L. Industries, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The evidence before us presents statistics reflecting great dis-
parity in the employment of blacks as compared to whites as
clerks, typists and technicians. The Company apparently main-
tained a white-only policy in these departments prior to the effec-
tive date of the Civil Rights Act. We think the statistics,
when considered in the light of the Company's past discrimina-
tory policies and its failure to fully ameliorate those policies,
established an inference of discrimination which the Company
had failed to rebut by its assertion of nondiscriminatory hiring
policies.7 0
268. Id. at 369. In addition to showing that the defendant has vested unguarded discretion
in their evaluators, a showing that the defendant uses non-validated objective tests will
bolster a plaintiff's statistical evidence. See, e.g., Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159,
1185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (noting that the Wonderlic test "has been
shown to be discriminatory in impact in a number of other Title Vn cases."); United States
v. N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F Supp.
961 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
269. 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.15 (1977).
270. 479 F.2d at 370.
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In Parson, the defendant's discrimination before 1965 helped the
court conclude that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case
of discrimination.2 1
Thus, three types of evidence-individual testimony, showings of
potentially discriminatory employment practices, and showings of
a history of past discrimination-help bolster statistical evidence of
discrimination. The first type of evidence can provide the strongest
help because it can virtually provide the plaintiff with "smoking
gun" proof. At its weakest, it still helps to bring the cold numbers
to life for the court. Potentially discriminatory employment prac-
tices also may count heavily against employers because courts are
highly suspicious of unguarded employment practices and may ex-
pect them to result in discrimination. A showing of a past history
of discrimination provides less direct help; it merely leads a court
to conclude that the defendant is predisposed to discrimination.
Unless the defendant can show that he has reformed, however, the
court may find that his past history of discrimination significantly
strengthens a statistical inference of discrimination.
DEFENDING DISCRIMINATION SUITS
Burden of Proof
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 2 the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a formula for allocating the burden of proof in private,
non-class action employment discrimination suits. The Court
recognized that the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination. It held that this initial burden
could be met by a plaintiff's showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications. 274
Once the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the burden
271. 575 F.2d at 1387.
272. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
273. Id. at 802.
274. Id.
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of proof shifts to the defendant. At this point, the employer can
escape liability by articulating "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection."' s The Court in McDonnell
Douglas acknowledged that an applicant's illegal actions against
the defendant would constitute such a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for rejection.7 6 Once the defendant has given a nondiscrimi-
natory reason for rejection of the plaintiff, the burden of proof shifts
back to the plaintiff. At this point, the plaintiff can keep his case
alive by attempting to prove that the defendant's "stated reason for
[his] rejection was in fact [a] pretext" for discrimination. ' One
way for the plaintiff to show this would be to prove that the defen-
dant did not apply its policy equally to protected and non-protected
class members.
In Teamsters v. United States, 278 the Court cautioned that
McDonnell Douglas had not created an "inflexible formulation" for
the order and allocation of the burden of proof in employment dis-
crimination cases. 5 Although the McDonnell Douglas formula can-
not be regarded as definitive, it has been very influential in all types
of employment discrimination litigation.2 80 Recently, the Court gave
further guidance on the allocation of the burden of proof in discrimi-
nation suits.
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,"' the three individual
plaintiffs, black bricklayers, established the McDonnell Douglas
formula of prima facie discrimination by showing that they were
qualified bricklayers, that the defendant had been hiring bricklay-
ers but had rejected the plaintiffs despite their qualifications, and
that the defendant had continued to seek applications from simi-
larly qualified bricklayers after rejecting the plaintiffs. The defen-
dant attempted to rebut this prima facie showing by arguing that
the reason for its hiring policies had been business necessity The
employer had been hiring bricklayers to reline a furnace in a steel
mill. The job necessitated shutting down the furnace and therefore
275. Id.
276. Id. at 803.
277. Id. at 804.
278. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
279. Id. at 358.
280. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (federal pattern or practice
suit); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (private class action).
281. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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had to be performed expertly and within strict time limits. Conse-
quently, the defendant's foreman had hired only bricklayers whom
he knew to be skilled, or who had been recommendbd to him.212 The
overall result of this process was not discriminatory; a higher per-
centage of black bricklayers had worked on the job than the percen-
tage of blacks in the relevant SMSA. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit held that the employer had not rebutted effectively the
plaintiff's prima facie case because it could have devised a hiring
policy that would have served its needs and enabled it to consider
more minority applications. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that:
when the prima facie case is understood in the light of the opinion
in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which
shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based his
employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an
illegitimate one such as race. To prove that, he need not prove
that he pursued the course which would both enable him to
achieve his own business goal and allow him to consider the most
employment applications.2
Furnco makes clear that, at least in suits in which the plaintiff is
not able to show an overall discriminatory effect, an employer will
be able to escape liability if his policies serve legitimate ends, even
though better policies for the purposes of affirmative action could
have been devised.
In November, 1978, the Court granted certiorari in the case of
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney 284 In granting
certiorari, the Court reaffirmed that under McDonnell Douglas and
Furnco, an employer need not prove the absence of a discriminatory
motive in order to rebut a prima facie case. He meets his burden
when he articulates "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection."' 5
Preventing a Court From Drawing an Inference of Discrimination
From a Statistical Showing
As has been shown, plaintiffs can establish prima facie cases of
282. Id. at 570.
283. Id. at 577.
284. 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978).
285. Id., quoting Furnco.
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discrimination through the use of statistics. When the thrust of the
plaintiff's case is that the employer's practices have a disparate
effect on a protected class and he is able to present prima facie proof
of this effect with statistics, the employer's burden of proof in rebut-
tal is much more difficult to meet than in the McDonnell Douglas
situation. Therefore, a defendant's first line of defense in a discrimi-
nation suit must be to discredit the plaintiff's statistical showing to
prevent the court from finding that a prima facie case has been
made.
Fortunately for employers, the difficulties inherent in constitut-
ing statistical analyses afford ample ground for attacks on plaintiff's
statistical showings. Hazelwood opened the door to sophisticated
attack on the labor market selected by plaintiffs for the purposes of
comparison. Pressetsen illustrated the vulnerability of complex sta-
tistical analyses, such as regression analysis, to attacks by defense
experts.
Hazelwood was a double boon to defendants. First, it recognized
that relevant labor markets have precise geographical limits. After
Hazelwood, suburban employers can be expected to argue, as did
the defendants in Hazelwood, that their markets do not include the
more heavily black and Hispanic cities."8 6 City employers, on the
other hand, will argue that their hiring area includes the suburbs,
thus lessening the minority percentage in the relevant labor mar-
ket."' The highly complex instructions handed down by the Court
to guide determination of the relevant geographic market 88 make it
unlikely that courts will be able to resolve the issue with any degree
of certainty Presumably, because plaintiffs have the burden of
proof, the increased complexity of establishing the relevant labor
market should work against them.
The Court in Hazelwood's recognition that the relevant labor pool
may consist only of qualified workers is a second boon to defendants
and one that is especially helpful for higher level white collar em-
ployers. As illustrated by Pressetsen, courts may be led to glean the
size of the relevant labor pool from the number of protected class
members employed in similar occupations. The better able an em-
ployer is to demonstrate that his work is specialized and requires
286. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
287. See, e.g., Smith v. Union Oil, 17 FEP Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
288. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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skills not found in the general population, the better able he will be
to limit the size of the relevant labor market. 219
Pressetsen indicates the success that defense experts may have at
rebutting statistical showings. Indeed, in Pressetsen, the parties
were each so successful at undermining the opponent's statistical
showing that the court commented:
It seems to the Court that each side has done a superior job in
challenging the other's regression analysis, but only a mediocre
job in supporting their own. In essence, they have destroyed each
other and the Court is, in effect, left with nothing.2"'
In Pressetsen, Swarthmore College convinced the court that the
plaintiff's salary regression analysis was
unreliable since it did not include such factors as scholarship,
teaching ability, publications, some assessment of teaching abil-
ity, quality of degree, career interruptions, career continuity,
quality of publications, administrative responsibility and some
measure of committee work."'
These missing factors are in large degree subjective. Clearly, it will
be difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to formulate a reliable
regression analysis when the court believes that the analysis must
reflect ability and quality of work. The plaintiffs refuted the Col-
lege's own regression analysis by arguing that the inflation figure
used by the defendant was susceptible to bias.292 The court con-
cluded that, like the plaintiffs, the defendants had failed to include
all the relevant variables in the analysis.
Another serious flaw in the plaintiff's salary analysis in Pressetsen
was the exclusion of rank as a variable. The plaintiffs had excluded
rank on the ground that including it would conceal "the fact that
women at Swarthmore College took longer on the average to reach
289. See, e.g., Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974) (relevant labor market
is persons who can type 60 words per minute); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F Supp.
593 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (relevant labor market is female faculty employed at comparable col-
leges); Davis v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 416 F Supp. 997 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(relevant market is persons interested in schools of architecture). See also Smith v. Union
Oil Co., 17 FEP Cas. 960 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (accepting that clerical workers in the field of
finance perform specialized work).
290. 442 F Supp. at 619.
291. Id. at 616.
292. Id. at 618.
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a given rank than did men.1113 The defendants showed that when
rank was included, no significant disparity existed in the average
salaries of men and women.294 Whether the exclusion of rank was
proper turned on whether the plaintiffs had proven that women were
discriminated against m promotion rate. The court had found the
plaintiffs' promotional studies to be unreliable because they ex-
cluded the variables of prior experience, division, and publica-
tions.15 Therefore, because the plaintiffs had failed to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination in promotion, the exclusion of
rank as a variable in the salary analysis was held to be improper.59
A third flaw in the salary analysis was that the plaintiffs' analysis
had aggregated junior and senior appointments. The College argued
successfully that faculty at junior and senior levels were drawn from
separate labor pools and that a study that failed to distinguish
between the two pools would be biased. One of the defendants'
experts testified that:
[i]f, for example, it is the case that the pool from which
senior appointments are drawn is predominantly male and the
pool from which junior appointments are drawn is mixed, the
result of aggregation will be to mix the effect of seniority with the
effect of sex and make it impossible properly to sort out what
policies may be due to seniority and what policies may be due to
sex.
297
In addition to the debates generated over inclusion of variables and
treatment of levels of appointments, the parties were unable to
resolve to the court's satisfaction the problems of how to deal with
inactive members of the faculty and the varying career and salary
slopes within different divisions. The defendants argued success-
fully that one variable which the plaintiffs had treated as an inde-
pendent variable or baseline characteristic, years since highest de-
gree, was in fact a dependent variable, one that could change during
employment.298 Treatment of a dependent variable as an indepen-
dent variable also biased the defendants' study As noted above, the
293. Id. at 615.
294. Id. at 614.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 615.
297. Id. at 616.
298. Id. at 609.
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net effect of expert criticism on both sides was to discredit all the
statistical studies. Because the burden of proof was on the plaintiffs,
this resulted in victory for the defendants.
Employers also can attack statistical analyses by arguing that the
universe of affected employees is too small to give rise to a valid
statistical showing. '99 This defense was successful in Harper v.
Trans World Airlines"' and in Cedeck v Hamiltonian Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n.301 Large employers might be able to use this
defense if they can convince the court to examine their hiring prac-
tices on a department-by-department basis.
Defenses to Statistical Showings
If the defendant is unable to discredit the plaintiff's statistical
analysis, the defendant must fall back on his second line of defense;
he must attempt to rebut the inference of discrimination that the
court will draw from the statistics. A defense that any statistical
disparities are not due to present employment practices is one way
that the defendant can attempt to rebut an inference of discrimina-
tion.
The strength and scope of a no-present-violation defense is un-
certain. The lower courts had developed a theory of Title VII liabil-
ity under which an employer was liable if his present neutral em-
ployment practices perpetuated in the present the effect of past
discrimination." ' This theory was used mainly against facially
neutral seniority systems. Under this theory, an employer could not
escape liability merely by saying that it had ceased its discrimina-
tory practices after the passage of Title VII or that any complaints
of discrimination were time-barred.
The Supreme Court's decision in United Airlines v. Evans33 casts
doubt on the continued viability of this theory of liability for the
locked-in effects of past discrimination. In Evans, a female plaintiff
299. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
300. 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975) (statistics based on five married couples have little
predictive value and must be disregarded).
301. 414 F Supp. 495 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (statistics based on 55 employees must be disre-
garded).
302. This theory originated in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968). See also Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); B. SCHLEI & P GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 30-31.
303. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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alleged that United's seniority system gave present effect to a past
act of discrimination. Specifically, she argued that she had been
discriminatorily forced to resign in 1968 when she got married.
When the plaintiff was rehired in 1972, she was given no credit for
her past services and, as a result, was junior to males who had been
hired after 1968. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
United's seniority system was not bona fide because it gave present
effect to the plaintiff's discriminatory discharge. The Court also cast
doubt on whether employers could be held liable for past acts of
discrimination if those acts were not the subject of timely com-
plaints:
Respondent is correct in pointing out that the seniority system
gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. But United
was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent
failed to file a charge of discrimination within the 90 days then
allowed by § 706(d) [of Title VIII. A discriminatory act which
is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent
of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was
passed. It may constitute relevant background evidence in a pro-
ceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but
separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history
which has no present legal consequences." 4
Relying on Evans, employers can argue that their hiring practices
must be judged as of "right now," that is, within the 180-day period
for filing Title VII complaints."'i Whatever their practices were be-
fore that period, they are entitled to treat them as legal so long as
no complaint was made.
The major problem with this argument is that it is unclear from
the Evans opinion whether the Court's holding is limited to senior-
ity systems, which are given special protection under Title VI.'1
Authority exists that Evans should not be read as so limited. In
Farris v. Board of Education of St. Louis,30 1 the Eighth Circuit ap-
plied Evans to a salary claim. Because of pregnancy, the plaintiff
had been compelled to take a leave of absence from her high school
teaching position in 1970. As a result, she did not receive her annual
304. Id. at 558.
305. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1974).
306. See id. at § 2000e-2(h).
307. 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978).
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incremental pay raise for that-year. Each year thereafter she was
one step lower on the salary schedule than she would have been but
for the mandatory pregnancy leave. The Eighth Circuit held that
because Title VII did not apply to schools in 1970 and because the
plaintiff had not filed a charge, the school board could treat its
original act as lawful. Because incremental increases are not cur-
rently dependent on sex, the court held that the school board was
not guilty of any present violation of the Act."'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
ruled twice that Evans is not limited to seniority cases. In Freude
v. Bell Telephone Co.,39 the court stated that "[ilt is plain that
the basic holding of Evans is that a current nondiscriminatory pol-
icy will not revive a time-barred act of discrimination even though
such policy gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. 1"3
In Dickerson v. United States Steel,3t 1 the court stated that Evans
was based on two independent grounds:
[T]hat the statute of limitations is an absolute bar and that it
cannot be circumvented by lock-in. A second and independent
holding said that such a past event may not serve as a basis for
a present challenge to a neutral seniority system.3 12
These decisions thus open the door to the possibility that an em-
ployer's liability may be cut off even for practices followed after the
applicable date of Title VII or Executive Order 11246, '3 so long as
his present practices are nondiscriminatory
The Tenth Circuit, however, recently rejected this theory In
United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,3 4 the court held that
a no-transfer rule locked in past discrimination and therefore was
unlawful. The court stated:
In Griggs, the Court was concerned with the present conse-
quences and practices which perpetuate the effects of the past
discriminatory act, not the past act itself. There is not the slight-
308. Id. at 768.
309. 438 F Supp. 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
310. Id. at 1061.
311. 439 F Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 582 F.2d 827 (3d
Cir. 1978).
312. 439 F Supp. at 70.
313. See note 2 supra.
314. Nos. 78-1096, 1097, 1098 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1979).
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est indication in Evans that the Supreme Court intended to
overrule or disassociate itself from the decision in Griggs. Evans
and also Teamsters merely explained the exception to Gnggs
which was provided in § 703 for bona fide seniority systems.
Inasmuch then as the no-transfer rule does not constitute a
bona fide seniority system, the rule in Griggs is still via-
ble 315
In view of the ambiguity of Evans, it is likely that not all circuits
will find the Tenth Circuit's reasoning persuasive.1
When an employer's practices have been shown to have a present
disparate effect, he can attempt to justify those practices under the
business necessity doctrine. The most widely followed formulation
of that doctrine was enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp. :317
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and effi-
cient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must
be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the chal-
lenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose
it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable
alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish
the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with
a lesser differential racial impact. 31 8
The three-pronged test found in the Robinson formulation has made
315. Id., slip op. at 13.
316. The Second Circuit in EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers sug-
gested a public policy argument for limiting an employer's liability. 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.
1977). In Local 14, one of the defendant unions had discriminated before the effective date
of Title VII. Since that date, however, it had admitted a percentage of minority members
greater than or equal to the minority percentage in the relevant labor market, had hired
minority officers, and had participated in affirmative action programs. In reversing a trial
court holding that the union was guilty of discrimination, the Second Circuit stated:
It does not further the purposes of Title VII to find liability in a union which
has seemingly complied with the Act's provisions since its enactment in 1965.
We must carefully balance the need for effective enforcement of the Act against
overzealous enforcement which can only lead to resentment and a resistance to
change.
Id. at 255 (citation omitted). This expressed reluctance to penalize defendants who currently
are in compliance with Title VII can furnish additional fuel to employers who wish to argue
that Evans makes past practices irrelevant to present findings of discrimination.
317. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
318. Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted).
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the business necessity defense a very narrow one in the blue collar
context. There have not been many cases where the defense has
been used in a white collar context.
White collar employers would have little difficulty demonstrating
that it is a business necessity that their secretaries know how to type
and that their accountants know how to add. When employment
requirements bear a more tenuous relationship to ability to perform
a job, the courts have been tolerant of such requirements when
public safety depends to some extent on the quality of the defen-
dant's employees, as with pilots39 or policemen.32 1
To predict how employers will fare with a business necessity de-
fense in the white collar context is difficult. On the one hand, courts
recognize the necessity that some white collar employees possess
certain subjective qualifications. On the other hand, the court prob-
ably will not view customer preference as a business necessity 321
Furthermore, the element of public safety that has been most im-
portant in blue collar business necessity cases is largely absent in
the white collar context.
Finally, even if the courts recognize certain subjective qualities as
being necessary for the performance of a white collar job, employers
likely will be unable to meet the third prong of the Robinson test,
the lack of acceptable alternative methods of picking such employ-
ees with a lesser disparate effect than their current practice. A high
probability exists that the courts will find liability if they believe
the selection or promotion process could have been better safe-
guarded to avoid potential discrimination. 32 2 Thus, although in
some ways, courts are more sensitive to the business needs of white
collar employers than to those of blue collar employers, the business
necessity defense may be of little help to employers whose practices
are shown to have a discriminatory impact.
319. See, e.g., Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
320. Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972); League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F Supp. 723
(N.D. Ohio 1975).
321. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 404
U.S. 950 (1971) (sex not a bona fide occupational qualification although Pan Am's customers
overwhelmingly preferred female flight attendants).
322. See, e.g., Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a broad range of problems of substance
and of evidence in equal opportunity law at the white collar and
professional levels. This review reveals that, although the Title VII
mandate applies with full force to every level of employment, the
courts have recognized that the problems of devising non-
discriminatory employment practices differ in subtle and obvious
ways among different types of employment. Yet, for the most part,
this recognition has been implicit, rather than explicit. As a result,
white collar and professional employers have received little guid-
ance as to how they may devise lawful practices suited to their needs
to employ persons whose relative qualifications must be judged
subjectively It is hoped that the predicted increase in volume of
litigation challenging white collar and professional employers will
result in the development of a jurisprudence which explicitly recog-
nizes that subjective employment practices are not inherently sus-
pect under Title VII or any other equal opportunity law so long as
necessary subjective determinations are made in the context of a
fair, safeguarded procedure.
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